

289238

JPRS-UMA-84-056

24 August 1984

19981026 104

USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 2

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

6
79
A65

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semimonthly by the NTIS, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

Soviet books and journal articles displaying a copyright notice are reproduced and sold by NTIS with permission of the copyright agency of the Soviet Union. Permission for further reproduction must be obtained from copyright owner.

24 August 1984

USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS

CONTENTS

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Party Must Correct Problems of Misassigned Warrant Officers (P. Burikov, Yu. Servianov; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	1
Improvement of Propaganda Billboards Discussed (V. Salashin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 6 Jul 84).....	5

ARMED FORCES

Problems, Necessity of Warrant Officer Training Discussed (E. Dertkezov, et al.; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	6
Misuse, Disuse of Simulators Assailed (V. Chernikov; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	13
Letters to ZNAMENOSETS Editor, Responses (ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84)	17
Red Tape Decried, Editorial	
Responses to Lovesick Serviceman, Editorial	
Advice for the Woman, by Anna Malykh	
Advice for the Serviceman, by G. Rybakov	
A Married Couple's Advice, by Mukhtarov	
More Advice	
Control Point Duty Deficiencies, Editorial	
Needed House Repairs Scheduled, Editorial	
Deficient Komsomol Work Improved, Editorial	
Delayed Release Punished, Editorial	
Pay Problems Resolved, Editorial	
Basis for Award Clarified, Editorial	
Emergency Leave Procedures Clarified	

Sociometric Study of Platoon Yields Applicable Results (V. Stanotin, N. Kozlovskiy; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	27
Volkogonov Discusses Molding of 'New Man' (D. A. Volkogonov; KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 13 May 84).....	41
Beloborodov, Yazov, Bobylev Extol Soviet WWII Victory (Various sources, 9 May 84).....	47
Army General Beloborodov Interviewed, A. Beloborodov Interview	
Army General Yazov, by D. Yazov	
Colonel General S. Bobylev, by S. Bobylev	
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Identifies Officer (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 26 Jul 84).....	59
GROUND FORCES	
Automatic Weapons Training Procedures Reviewed (V. Dotsenko; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	60
Role of Artillery Repair Brigades Examined (R. Mustafin; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	63
NAVAL FORCES	
Article Accuses U.S. of Using Navy for 'Aggressive Purposes' (G. Suvorov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 14 Jun 84).....	66
Naval School in Tashkent Operates With Artificial 'Sea' (A. Veklich; YOSH LENINCHI, 5 Feb 84).....	69
DOSAAF	
DOSAAF Sponsors Radio Direction-Finding Competition (V. Shabalin; TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 20 Apr 84).....	70
Riflery at Tashkent Sports Club (E. Maksumov; YOSH LENINCHI, 5 Feb 84).....	71
MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES	
Russian Key to Success at Alma-Ata Military Academy (I. Hikmatov; YOSH LENINCHI, 5 Feb 84).....	72
FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS	
Possible Use of Tanks Against Helicopters Examined (Ye. Viktorov; ZNAMENOSETS, No 6, Jun 84).....	73

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

PARTY MUST CORRECT PROBLEMS OF MISASSIGNED WARRANT OFFICERS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84)
pp 12-13

[Article by ZNAMENOSETS correspondent Capt 1st Rank P. Burikov, Red Banner Carpathian Military District, and commentary by Maj Gen Tank Trps Yu. Servianov, chief of a department of USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate: "TDY in Response to a Letter: Listed in the Table of Organization"]

[Text] "I wrote a request for transfer to a new duty station in the Far East Military District and was told that this was not advisable in the interests of subunit combat readiness. I agree that combat readiness is the key factor for which we train daily, but then how is one to understand the use of some warrant officers [praporshchiki] in other than their authorized position? Doesn't combat readiness suffer from this?"

WO D. Tsegel'nik

The editors acquainted the district personnel directorate with this letter, and later the correspondent visited the unit where the letter's author serves. Talks with the commander and political officer convinced me that WO Tsegel'nik is needed in the subunit. He is a master of combat qualification, diligently performs official and social duties and has been decorated with two "Distinction in Military Service" medals. His ability to draw sketches and diagrams also is valued on the staff. In short, it is a pity to release such a specialist, and there are no especially valid reasons for transfer to another district.

It is also easy to see that the unit from which the letter came is doing much for successful accomplishment of training missions, fulfillment of socialist pledges, strengthening vigilance and improving combat readiness. These matters also are discussed frequently at party and Komsomol meetings and at officer and warrant officer conferences. Graphic slogans and posters are an invocatory reminder of them.

And what is the role of unit warrant officers in training and indoctrinating subordinates and in fulfilling training missions? The commander comments on many of them with praise and gives the names of the best ones who diligently

learn for themselves and teach subordinates and who, if necessary, hold back no effort or time to maintain high combat readiness.

But it was without particular willingness that the commander spoke about warrant officers who were not present in the unit or who had been temporarily shifted to other positions. Nevertheless, who were they?

WO Ye. Vdovin completed a specialist course and was assigned to the position of chief of an equipment van, but he had not been seen in the subunit for more than a year now. He had been detached for duty to higher headquarters on the basis of a verbal instruction. It is said that his handwriting is good and he is able to draw sketches and diagrams.

WO I. Kuchinskiy holds the position of chief of an equipment van, but he also has been placed on detached duty to the headquarters.

WO Yu. Kirdyakin is listed in the table of organization as the chief of a radio receiving center, but his permanent job for a long while has been sport shooting.

WO M. Babiychuk is listed as chief of a radio station, but in fact he plays in the post band.

The list of persons "absent" could be continued, but there is obviously no need for this. Everyone in the unit knows about them and remembers them when it becomes difficult. But they are in no hurry to make all appointed persons conform to the T/O&E documents.

"At times it is necessary to shift warrant officers within subunits for temporary performance of assignments," says the unit commander, "but we will correct this. And those who were taken from us should be returned. It isn't easy for us, and they aren't growing professionally."

The fact that the absence of some warrant officers in authorized positions reduces the quality of combat training, complicates the work of other specialists and imposes additional burdens on them also was mentioned at a party meeting. Party members Tseloval'nikov, Tsegel'nik and others expressed their opinion about this in particular. And how did the party committee react to the critical comments?

"I see nothing bad in this," says party committee member Comrade V. Dobroskok.

"And if one acts on principle?"

"Of course, if one acts on principle then the omissions must be remedied, but not everything here depends on us."

A position of nonintervention is apparent in this reasoning by the party activist. The position is convenient: let others handle the placement of warrant officers; the party committee has many other things to do. But the party organization's most important concern must be to assure the military

collective's combat readiness and the ability of all its elements large and small to begin performing the combat mission at any moment. It is apropos here to recall the requirement expressed by the USSR minister of defense at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries to the effect that the damage done by deficiencies connected with servicemen's extensive separation from classes has a negative effect on maintaining constant combat readiness.

It should not be forgotten that instances of an infraction of T/O&E discipline also may lead to moral damages in the collective. People in the unit don't like to remember the incident with former WO V. Klimenko now. He was listed in a high T/O&E category but didn't engage in training and indoctrinating subordinates. The important thing for Klimenko was design work and making souvenirs. Taking advantage of a lack of supervision, he took the path of abuses.

The higher staff also knows about the instances of an infraction of T/O&E discipline. The number of warrant officers who for a long while have been performing duties unrelated to the positions they hold is causing concern here as well.

Here too, however, an insufficiently principled view of this problem apparently is delaying resolute steps to restrict the liberties taken with warrant officer utilization. Confirmation of this is an overheard phrase: "Sometimes life requires..." That means some people view an infraction of T/O&E discipline as a commonplace fact which has become ordinary and customary for some people in charge. This is also indicated by the very late response received by the editors to the query on WO Tsegel'nik's letter. The response states meagerly: "The facts presented in Comrade Tsegel'nik's letter were partially confirmed, and appropriate decisions were made." And there was the signature: "Romanovskiy." It isn't clear which facts were confirmed and which weren't, or what had been planned to be done here so that warrant officer placement fully contributed to an increase in the subunits' combat readiness.

It was not by chance that the editors soon received another letter from WO Tsegel'nik. He writes that an unpleasant atmosphere had developed around him in service. One of those who had been "absent" and whom he had mentioned earlier reproaches him for "airing dirty linen." He also had no support from certain appointed persons, and now his opinion about the need for a transfer to another duty station had been reinforced.

Obviously it is very difficult for some of the appointed persons to officially recognize the deficiencies. Everyone talks about high combat readiness, but when there is a let-up in some area, not everyone takes necessary steps.

Sr WO V. Ponteleymonov writes the editors about this very thing: "According to the table of organization, Sr WO A. Patsyuk holds the position of first sergeant in the adjacent subunit, but he has been in the barracks only two days over the last few years. I have been assigned to perform his duties, but I have my own company. It is hard to combine two difficult positions. At times I am given a substitute, but..."

We won't draw the conclusion that infractions of T/O&E discipline, and consequently of financial discipline have become a widespread phenomenon, but even

isolated instances should be viewed as deviations from military order which are a detriment to the command development of officers' closest assistants and to an improvement in their authority and role in training and indoctrinating subordinates. Remedyng these deficiencies means to exert a positive effect on a further increase in the subunits' combat readiness.

Here are the comments by Maj Gen Tank Trps Yu. Servianov, chief of a department of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate:

The CPSU Central Committee performs persistent work to strengthen order in all sectors of the building of communism. Steps aimed at improving labor, production, planning and state discipline and strengthening socialist legality--steps which have received national approval--are being carried out. The Extraordinary February 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum pointed out that "the issue of efficiency and order is a key, fundamental issue for us. There can be no two opinions about this."

The party demands also found wide support among Soviet military personnel. Commanders, political entities and party organizations are doing much to impose firm regulation order in the units and aboard ships. The attainment of high results in combat training is inconceivable without this, and therefore we must view any digression from established rules in the light of combat readiness. The author of the article is correct in saying that the lengthy separation of warrant officers from their performance of immediate official duties contributes nothing to strengthening combat readiness.

Everything would appear to be clear here. Unfortunately, in some places immediate interests of appointed persons overshadow the resolution of main issues on the placement, training and indoctrination of warrant officer cadres. It cannot be forgotten that a person who today separates officers' closest assistants from the performance of their official duties cannot hope for good training or cohesiveness of their subordinate subunits or for the professional growth of the warrant officers themselves. It will be difficult to make up for lost time. It is a mistake to think that matters of combat readiness are decided only on the staffs or at the ranges... There must not be the slightest break in its entire chain.

The personnel document is a unique law. It is drawn up on the basis of Great Patriotic War experience and with consideration of the demands of modern combat. No one has the right to violate it. It will be apropos here to recall Lenin's understanding of a high degree of execution and precise observance of laws, directives and instructions. The slightest attempt by anyone to go around them always sparked a sharp protest in Vladimir Il'ich. This matter also was posed acutely at the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

The staffs, personnel entities and officers of the finance service are called upon to stand guard over strict observance of T/O&E discipline. In this instance they should display principle, carefully examine every fact mentioned in the published article, and help the unit command element completely fulfill directions of the USSR deputy minister of defense for personnel and impose proper order in the placement of warrant officers in conformity with the positions they hold. Measures of an organizational and indoctrinal nature will have a positive effect on warrant officer development and will elevate their role in strengthening subunit combat readiness.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

IMPROVEMENT OF PROPAGANDA BILLBOARDS DISCUSSED

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 July 1984 carries on page 2 a 1,300-word article by Lt Col V. Salashin, a senior instructor in the Propaganda and Agitation Division of the political administration of the Odessa Military District. His comments focus on the ineffective use of "visual propaganda" (billboards and panels) on an unnamed military base. Some billboards are, he says "clearly overloaded with textual material which is impossible to read unless one walks right up to them" while others suffer from anachronistic pictures of three-edged bayonets and slogans attacking the "atrocities of American soldiers during the war in Korea, although after that bloody adventure American soldiers have brought death and destruction to Vietnam, Lebanon and Grenada." Salashin suggest a variety of means to correct what he calls this "absence of topicality," including following the examples of propaganda billboards of the war years and careful selection, training and assignment of potential artists. He calls for billboards created on the principles of energy and interchangeability, and for "those forms of visual means into which changes can easily be inserted by changing this or that panel or by rearranging the parts."

CSO: 1801/381

ARMED FORCES

PROBLEMS, NECESSITY OF WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) pp 6-8

[Article by Col E. Dertkezov, senior officer of GUBP SV [Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces], Lt Col V. Semenchenko, and ZNAMENOSETS correspondent Lt Col V. Khoreshko, Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District: "ZNAMENOSETS Studies the Problem of the Quality of Warrant Officer Command Training: There is a System..."]

[Text] The responsibility of warrant officers [praporshchiki] for constant readiness of their entrusted platoons, teams, crews and groups is determined by the ever-growing scope and complexity of missions assigned to the small subunits in modern combat. Today warrant officers are required to conduct combined-arms combat skillfully, to make full use of the capabilities of weapons and equipment, to preserve self-control and combat activeness under all conditions, and to train and indoctrinate subordinates.

Just what are the actual indicators achieved in the military-professional and methods training of this category of servicemen? What reserves in perfecting their command qualities have not yet been used?

To answer these questions, the journal editors together with the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate studied the practice of conducting command training classes in one of the units of the Order of Lenin Leningrad Military District during the winter training period.

The Secret of Being Busy

In the heated days of an inspection when all personnel were taking a test some warrant officers both in a command profile and in technical and logistical profiles did not participate in fulfilling responsible exercises and norms. Noted opposite their names in the inspection sheets were: "TDY," "Work at senior commander's direction," "At the disposal of such-and-such a superior," and so on.

Of course, even on inspection days people are needed for uninterrupted support of normal troop life. As it later was learned, however, some commanders tried

to have warrant officers work on various activities specifically in the period of final problems out of fear that their results would be poor, especially in tactical and weapons training and in defense against mass destruction weapons. It turns out that this is the secret of the warrant officers' workload at the most responsible period of the unit's life.

And the requirements placed on those who were inspected clearly were understated. For example, platoon commanders warrant officers G. Rak, N. Solov'yev, V. Maksimov, R. Karachko and others were checked in far from all the training subjects. By the way, none of them knew what final grades they had received for the training period, although there is a procedure for determining the grade in command training for warrant officers holding command positions.

Warrant officer training in combined-arms training subjects is done in a single group, while training in other subjects is done in groups according to positions and specialties. Warrant officers holding officer positions or positions as senior company or battery technicians train together with the officers.

There is also extensive use of training in the form of supplementary classes and practices, individual assignments, and independent work.

In the course of planning, the unit commander allocated class subjects among the chiefs of services and the best trained officers were used to conduct the classes. They were told at the beginning of the training year where they would conduct which classes.

The groups in which warrant officers N. Boldyrev, A. Bogodist and G. Khromov work can be given as examples of skillful organization of command training. All program subjects are worked successfully here and as a result the overwhelming majority of students skillfully uses the knowledge gained for holding classes with subordinates.

In comparison with the corresponding period of the last training year, almost half of the warrant officers took a noticeable step forward in command development, which had a beneficial effect on the state of affairs in the platoons and crews.

But the study showed that the command training of many warrant officers leaves much to be desired, to put it mildly.

Course Efficiency

Officers who were platoon commanders, warrant officers who held officer positions, and senior company technicians arrived for the course in the unit. The officers who had been selected resembled each other both in their period of service and the positions they held (primarily they were commanders of motorized rifle and tank platoons). Each one had a solid store of knowledge gained at higher military schools and practical experience of serving in one position. This can't be said of the remaining course participants.

For example, WO V. Bebrish passed exams for military school as an external student, while some of his colleagues do not even have a warrant officer school behind them or they completed it in another profile. Some are studying in the institute by correspondence. And the warrant officers who assembled had the most varied positions: deputy battery commander, commanders of a surface-to-air missile platoon and a telephone platoon, commanders of an administrative platoon and a headquarters platoon.

When the warrant officers were acquainted with the subject matter of the course, one of them remarked: "These classes will give me little." He proved right to a certain extent.

While lectures on the substance and typical features of modern combined-arms combat fully satisfied all students, some comrades such as warrant officers O. Fomin, R. Karachko, I. Nagiyev, G. Portnov and others proved to be in great difficulty while working lessons on tactics. None of them was able to work with a map, plot the situation on it and read it quickly in a qualified manner.

They also didn't know theoretical provisions of the subjects they were working on: "Attack of a motorized rifle (or tank) company." Moreover, the tactical assignment was addressed entirely to motorized rifle and tank subunit commanders. It is true that in an attempt to catch the warrant officers' interest in a group exercise the instructor included certain matters of troop support in the assignment, but it was impossible to work such difficult tasks with quality in passing. The warrant officers wasted time for nothing.

What conclusion suggests itself?

This probably would not have happened had those in the unit taken a more imaginative approach to working the subject matter of the group exercise, with consideration of the warrant officers' official position and, specifically, had they given more attention to the work of appointed persons in supporting combat actions, i.e., those matters which directly concern specialists because of their content. This is especially so in that such matters are a stumbling block in exercises for many warrant officers.

On the other hand, the insufficiently planned organization of the classes also affected their quality. For example, under the plan there were to be classes in practice driving of armored and vehicular equipment, but the exercise was performed only by tank and motorized rifle platoon commanders in tanks and BMP's [infantry fighting vehicles]. The commanders of platoons authorized to have motor vehicles and armored personnel carriers were at the armored vehicle training area in the role of observers.

More also should have been expected from classes in the specialty groups, which made up a third of the course training time. The majority of chiefs of combat arms and services under whose direction the platoon commanders of special sub-units worked limited themselves to giving lectures. There should have been practical classes at which the warrant officers were to hone command, special and methods skills at their work stations. For example, according to the

chief of air defense, it turned out that the warrant officers assimilate the entire scope of duties in the specialty during combat work with their personnel. The fact is, however, that in addition to work skills on the authorized equipment (it is not superfluous to hone them in the course as well), a warrant officer also has to master the methodology of training team members, he has to be able to hold tactical drill problems with subordinates, and he must practice the norms with them. Unfortunately the methods training of warrant officers went by the board in the course.

Organizational blunders are like a mirror in reflecting the deficiencies of warrant officer training in the period between courses. The established procedure of drawing up the combat and political training plan is violated in some subunits. The "Warrant Officer Training" section, which must set the days and hours of classes with warrant officers, with an indication of the topic numbers and amount of hours for working the lessons in accordance with the Program, sometimes disappears from the plan.

The section entitled "Direction and Supervision of Combat and Political Training" again does not mention warrant officers, and the subjects and time periods for holding demonstration and methods classes are given only for officers. It is also very rare that one comes across the name of a warrant officer in the column entitled "Instructor's Position" in company schedules. That means for now they are not being actively included in classes as instructors or assistants.

Just how can the productivity of warrant officer command training be improved?

Reserves of Effectiveness

We repeat that many experienced specialists were included as class instructors for the course which was held. Each of them prepared instructive lectures on combined-arms, tactical, weapons and special training. But let's ask ourselves the question: Is a warrant officer capable of implementing all these varied recommendations in practice? Unfortunately not, because senior comrades do not take account of a very important parameter--the amount of time a trainee must spend on implementing them. We'll try to explain this thought.

Let's begin with the attitude toward a current opinion involving warrant officer training: "Command training is not subject to precise accounting. A good warrant officer studies as much as is necessary for the job." Hence the impression of the inapplicability of time standards to his work. It is impossible to agree with this.

When we speak of the scientific organization of command training (and this is a demand of the time) then we have to decide questions of the time, place and scope of material for day-to-day training. It has been calculated that in the group where Sr WO V. Skripnik works the study of mandatory literature and guidance documents, working out suggested variants of actions on the equipment, and compilation of various operation charts completely takes up the time set aside for scheduled study, classes in technical circles and independent training without leaving even a minute for carrying out no less mandatory current affairs in the company.

Of course, far from all warrant officers are able to use time correctly. A curious pattern was seen during the study: the more days given for preparation for a group exercise, the longer the beginning of work on the assignment was put off.

In this regard we should think of the possibility of planning independent warrant officer study in the class schedule, for this is one of the basic forms of their professional training. And we should indicate both the time and what they should work on in the hours set aside.

It is also advisable to indicate in the schedule an officer-adviser who will conduct a supplementary class if necessary, offer methods advice and help draw up a plan for holding a practice session. This approach will systematize warrant officers' work and will allow it to be made more productive.

The practice of giving individual assignments for warrant officers who do not have sufficient experience has proven itself in the foremost units. The assignments are drawn up in writing by the subunit commander or an officer of the appropriate unit staff service, with an indication of the deadline for execution. Class topics and content are chosen with consideration for the performers' level of training. Various memoranda on matters of practical importance for specialists, drawn up by warrant officers on the instruction of chiefs, as well as the compilation of lesson plans for specific topics for holding a class with the personnel are of great benefit.

With constant supervision over the fulfillment of individual assignments, this form becomes an effective means for broadening theoretical horizons, deepening military knowledge and improving methods proficiency. For example, it was largely thanks to this method that platoon commander WO V. Ustimov improved his individual training in a short period of time. He has a first class rating as a radio operator and a second class rating as a radio-relay mechanic. In addition, Ustimov has firm skills in being in charge of the personnel for setting up a station, constructing lines, and assuring stable operation of communications equipment in various kinds of combat.

In our view, experience in using the self-portrait method of working on oneself gained in some units is of interest. What does it consist of? By drawing up regular accounts in the workbook about fulfillment of assignments and indicating the time expenditures, trainees have an opportunity to control their own work, to perform a critical analysis of their use of allocated time and, on this basis, to avoid chance or superfluous elements in work. Also of value is the fact that this method permits study instructors to make better use of the warrant officers' individual features and arrange supervision over the completeness, quality and deadlines for working the program material.

It is a matter of determining more specifically the extent of knowledge which a particular specialist should receive and planning for consultations and supplementary assignments. By the way, quizzes are planned in some places for the purpose of checking the warrant officers' level of knowledge on a specific subject. A special instruction pamphlet is prepared prior to the quiz in which the basic lessons of the topic being studied independently are formulated. This significantly improves the personal responsibility of the people for their own training.

The quality with which individual assignments are performed and quiz results usually are entered in the command training register. This helps instructors react promptly to deficiencies which have cropped up.

Experience indicates that at least two hours of duty time per week should be given for independent study.

The fact that narrow practicality at times shows up in the training of this unit's warrant officers also drew attention to itself. The thinking here is that today's platoon commander, an officer, has the prospect of career growth. Consequently he needs both thorough military training and the ability to be in charge of subordinates. But the warrant officer will remain a platoon commander both tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. In five or ten years he will gather experience in some way or another, and proficiency will come to him in time. It is impossible to agree with such reasoning because, as the saying goes, no pains, no gains, and proficiency doesn't come as a matter of course. One doesn't have to go far for the facts.

Young WO N. Borisenko was practicing platoon actions in battle outposts with subordinates. He gave instructions uncertainly in all phases of the class, especially when they were addressed to the commander of the combat engineer squad. It was noted at the critique that Borisenko also wasn't able to develop the appropriate mental attitude in subordinates or adjust lively contact with the people. The soldiers functioned without mutual understanding.

This happened because the warrant officer was required to display qualities which were mentioned only casually in command classes. Unfortunately, the subject matter of a majority of the exercises, seminars and lectures does a poor job of orienting people toward what comprises the basis of a commander's practice--contact with subordinates and individual work with them.

This is why not only Borisenko, but also other young warrant officers experience a certain amount of confusion in managing people. The question arises in this regard: Is proper attention being shown to all elements of command training? Isn't the ratio of learning tactics, equipment and so on on the one hand and laws of pedagogics and psychology on the other being disrupted here?

It is difficult to give any kind of recommendations here, but the following method can be suggested as a test. In contrast to the established rule where one officer elaborates the topic of a command class and makes it known to students, we would recommend that three officers appear in those same hours. For example, in covering the topic "Fundamentals of tactical employment of Soviet Army Ground Forces subunits," these officers could be the commander, political worker and military physician-psychologist.

Of course, each of them doesn't have to present the material from "a" to "z." A study of fundamental provisions of combined-arms combat can be organized using prearranged examples.

In such a class the commander will tell about the essence and typical features of modern combat and will reveal the most important principles of conducting

it using examples from past exercises. The political worker will sharpen the warrant officers' attention to the features of working with people and the military physician will examine the subject from the position of psychological principles by which soldiers perceive actual combat, and he will tell about methods of maintaining mutual understanding and staunchness in the platoon.

It would appear that such a lesson would be instructive. In addition to the fact that the class topic is permeated and enriched with ideas of related disciplines, the very format of its conduct contributes to developing in warrant officers many of the qualities needed in combat.

Perhaps we should also ponder the question of including warrant officers in classes together with NCO's, such as when working topics in weapons and technical training, in military topography and in driving. In our view this will be very beneficial for specialists, especially for those who recently completed first-term service.

In conclusion we will give what are in our view the basic deficiencies in warrant officers' command training which were identified during the study. They are seen above all in planning which gives little consideration to the specific features of warrant officer duty, especially the duty of those holding positions as platoon commanders in special subunits. Deficiencies in preparing class instructors also appear because of organizational flaws. Such instructors place emphasis on lectures and make little use of such an important means of improving professional expertise as practice sessions and exercises in working specific practical lessons. The methodology where a warrant officer acts extremely rarely as an instructor in particular classes with the personnel obviously also cannot be considered proper. This delays command development by inadmissibly dragging it out over time.

In mentioning these weak elements, we are far from asserting that the unit is not working to remedy them. Activities both of a general and individual nature aimed at improving the quality and effectiveness of warrant officer command training have been held here and will continue to be held. By the way, we will note that much that has been planned by the staff already has been implemented.

But--and those in the unit agreed with this--reserves have been far from fully used in this matter. It is necessary to work properly to see that all warrant officers are armed with a knowledge of the fundamentals of conducting combined-arms combat and the experience of working with people, and in order to develop in each of them the high qualities of a military specialist, instructor, organizer and pedagogue-indoctrinator.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904
CSO: 1801/358

ARMED FORCES

MISUSE, DISUSE OF SIMULATORS ASSAILED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) pp 8-9

[Article by ZNAMENOSETS correspondent Engr-Lt Col V. Chernikov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "In Army and Navy Training Subunits: Simulators in Packing"]

[Text] Simulators with which training subunits are equipped are not always used with maximum return: classes are poorly organized, the special training of instructor-operators is "limping," and some pieces of equipment lie around unused.

Why does this happen?

Turning off the gray strip of highway, our "gazik" [a kind of jeep] bumped along the uneven dirt road, and here was the motorized riflemen's training center.

Together with the deputy unit commander, we approached a building where training equipment is located. Young privates were discussing something at the entrance. "Probably a break," I thought.

But at an NCO's command one of the cadets disappeared behind a dark blue canopy covering the door opening. It turned out that there was no break and we had arrived at the very height of training. In a couple of days the young driver-mechanics would have a march of many kilometers and now they were learning to drive infantry fighting vehicles with the help of film simulators. Frankly speaking, they were involuntarily squandering the time allotted for the classes: only one of the four available units was operating.

"Are the others unserviceable?" I asked the officer.

"All of them are operable, but for some reason there are no instructor-operators..."

On my journalistic trips I have had occasion to see disabled simulators resting beneath dusty covers, but for serviceable ones to be standing idle!

The TSG rocket launcher simulators were even less fortunate. For example, the company commanded by Capt M. Murashov tried to adjust one of them. Great

hopes were placed on Pvt N. Vorob'yev, who had a technical education. They didn't succeed in doing it in a rush, it was troublesome to understand, they were too busy, and it was hard to find space, and so they gave it up as hopeless. The other subunits didn't even make an attempt.

The ST-78 shooting simulator does not present any special problem in setting it up. Put a light awning over the areas and supply power, and that is practically all the work. The simulator permits firing a submachinegun at actual distances of from 100 to 800 meters. If there is a "hit" the target falls and if the bullet is sent into the white area it is immediately apparent why the shot failed. It is quick, convenient and effective, and one doesn't have to expend ammunition, but future squad commanders and other motorized riflemen train on the ST-78 only after traveling tens of kilometers to the training center. Even in these cases, however, a good half of the simulators remains in the company storeroom in untouched plant packing.

Yes, it is, frankly speaking, a sorry picture. But how are things with the neighbors? In literally an hour's travel we are in a training subunit where air defense NCO's are trained.

"Without simulators we hardly would have managed to develop confident skills in the young specialists," said the commander, summing up his narrative, when we had gone around the training field.

That day air defense cadets were working at nine training stations. At some they were using training equipment to practice the norms, at others they were firing against air targets and so on. One sensed from everything that every training minute was used earnestly here.

The secret of the air defense personnel's success is simple: the training field is assigned to Capt V. Oleynik. Together with subordinate officers, he is responsible both for the technical condition of the training facility and for organization of classes there. There are other jobs in the subunit but secondary matters here do not overshadow the primary job of combat training. Therefore all simulators are in action during class hours.

But no precise organization is apparent with the motorized riflemen in operating the film simulators, for example.

"Why were the other instructor-operators not there on the day of classes?" said company technical supply officer Capt Yu. Yermakov, repeating my question. He also was assigned to work with the film simulators. "Instructions came from headquarters and Pvt D. Yakimenko had to work in another location, while Jr Sgt M. Pipiya and Pvt N. Parchkhadze were ill."

"But where are their back-ups?"

"There are none at all..."

The fact that cadets "travel" 25 km on each unit on an average for the week also indicates the ineffective use of simulators. On one of the days the

odometer turned over only 0.8 km. The equipment actually was turned on, tested and turned off.

"No matter how many people are trained on the film simulators, we still can't get by without real infantry fighting vehicles," said the deputy unit commander, attempting to persuade me.

Doesn't this very strange contrast conceal motives for a cool attitude toward simulators on the part of certain officers, and the instructors above all?

It seems such a position also was reflected in the oversimplified methodology for holding practice sessions. Although the cadets had a march of many kilometers ahead of them, they were not working on specific narrative problems: overheated water, an abrupt change in road conditions and so on. The class instructor was not playing out situations which might arise in the field.

But there are deficiencies which are not just of a methodological and organizational nature. It became clear from a conversation with Jr Sgt M. Pipiya, who was assigned the maintenance of film simulators, that on the days when there were not even any classes he and his assistants, privates V. Kupchinskas, N. Parchkhadze and D. Yakimenko, would turn on the units. The classroom is cold and the plant specialists recommended that there be two hours set aside for warming up the units in wintertime: it was easier for the equipment, which must be operated at temperatures above zero, to take the supercooling. That is reasonable advice, but "warming up" a room with simulators is about the same as getting cottage cheese from cheesecake. Most important, it is not in the unit's interests to artificially increase the operating time of equipment by senselessly using up the prescribed resource.

It is impossible not to recall the air defense personnel's film simulator here! WO N. Spirov, who has special training, services it and conducts classes. The practice sessions have a good return and it is warm in the classroom.

In conversation the motorized riflemen complained more than once of a lack of spaces for training equipment, and that is the case. One cannot go to extremes, however. Today one of the film simulators is accommodated in the classroom used for studying the BMP [infantry fighting vehicle] equipment. An absurdity resulted: one group of trainees needs light and another needs only total darkness. It is not surprising that classes were held on the simulator only twice in three months!

Just what hinders the subunits in using training equipment with a maximum return? In my view, it is above all inertia of thinking and the habit of teaching cadets in the old way. Hence the attitude toward simulators as pariahs, and this despite the fact that their extensive use not only allows an increase in the effectiveness of combat training, but also a saving on fuel and other supplies and assets.

There is no question that the motorized riflemen cannot be depicted as such moss-covered enemies of progress. For example, they make effective use of equipment in teaching BMP gunner-operators in the weapons compound of that

same training center, but this is not enough today. It is recommended that simulators be introduced to the training process for preparing soldiers in a comprehensive manner, as the air defense personnel did. Only then will their benefit become perceptible.

That is the requirement of the Ground Forces Main Combat Training Directorate. Let's say that a training platoon of driver-mechanics is at work. One squad is studying theory in the programmed training classroom and the other squads are on devices with a mechanical attachment and on film simulators. The sub-units change places after fully working the lessons.

The mechanical simulators which now are at the tank training area must appear at the training center in order for classes to proceed in this manner. A programmed training classroom also is necessary.

The motorized riflemen have begun making a simulator building. It would appear that they will be given necessary assistance both by military builders and other specialists.

The special training of instructor-operators causes concern, for the effectiveness with which practice sessions are held depends largely on them. Film simulators have been assigned for the unit, but where is the person in charge of them? He is not yet provided for, and a small demand is being placed on the first-term soldier, a temporary person in the unit.

On the other hand, it would not hurt the commanders of training platoons where the driver-mechanics train to become more closely familiar themselves with the film simulators. It is not that difficult for officers with an engineer's diploma to understand both the equipment and the methodology for conducting practices. Having understood this, they could be of inestimable assistance to the instructor-operators.

The technical circle also would help improve the qualification of instructors and train back-ups. At one time Capt Yu. Yermakov gave the privates a certain technical minimum and now he advises them, but one also has to look at tomorrow: the number of devices soon will increase noticeably.

No matter how difficult it is to accommodate the equipment, one also cannot forget about spaces for the repair shop and storeroom. Before my eyes is the air defense men's training field with an outwardly plain building constructed by their hands. In addition to a classroom, it contains a room with benches for electrical-wiring, mechanical and other jobs. Everything necessary is at hand in case of repairs. Nearby is a storeroom where spare property and accessories are kept. In short, one senses a thrifty approach. How can it be otherwise?

The motorized riflemen have a long-range plan for modernizing the training facility, but for now the plan largely remains only on paper. It would appear that officers and subunit innovators should take up the work more vigorously. It is time to realize that it is impossible to accomplish the missions of preparing full-fledged specialists successfully without the presence of modern training equipment.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO ZNAMENOSETS EDITOR, RESPONSES

Red Tape Decried

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 18

[Editorial commentary: "Reader-Journal-Reader: A Fight Against Bureaucratism"]

[Text] The journal repeatedly has raised the issue of instances of an incorrect or incomplete formalization and the late dispatch of warrant officer [praporshchiki and michmany] personal files. Those persons specifically guilty of such negative phenomena have been criticized.

The first issue of ZNAMENOSETS for last year contained an article on this account by Maj Gen Tank Trps Yu. Servianov, chief of a department of the Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate. He announced practical steps which were taken to eliminate such deficiencies. It must be recognized that this had a positive effect and the number of complaints dropped noticeably.

But apparently not all appointed persons responsible for working with personal files locally drew the necessary conclusions for themselves. Therefore readers' complaints continue to appear in the editors' mail. For example, WO [Praporshchik] N. Cherkasov wrote that he completed warrant officer school in 1982, but his personal file was not sent to the unit where he now serves. Repeated queries on this matter produced no positive result, and he has not been paid the one-time remuneration or moving allowance for the family. The editors were forced to place the resolution of this matter under supervision.

WO V. Shatalov, who was transferred from Khabarovsk to Stavropol, also waited for his personal file for more than ten months. The editors again joined in to assist him. Col Yu. Shcherbakov responded from the personnel department of the North Caucasus Military District to which we turned that WO Shatalov's personal file had been sent to its destination. Unfortunately the response contained not a word about just who was at fault for such a lengthy delay of the warrant officer's personal file and what steps were being taken to preclude similar occurrences.

An even more striking occurrence happened with WO V. Loboda. After completing warrant officer school in the Transbaikal Military District back in 1980, he was sent for further service to a unit located abroad, but his personal file

did not arrive there. "The five-year period of service under the first obligation is expiring, but I can't extend it and be replaced from abroad since there is no personal file to this date and queries to various echelons have been without result." The editors also had to help the warrant officer locate his personal file in this instance.

Just why does this happen? It is obviously because lack of execution and callousness gain the upper hand over official duty in some appointed persons involved in working with personal files. What is typical is that the appearance is given in official responses to the editors' queries that seemingly nothing special happened: the personal file of warrant officer such-and-such was sent, and that's it. But for some reason there usually is silence about the persons specifically at fault for the red tape and about those who don't consider it mandatory to follow prescribed rules. As a result such people go unpunished, their official unconscientiousness is not properly evaluated and no demands are placed on them. Everything remains as it was.

It is impossible to be reconciled with this situation and the editors deem it necessary to return to the question of the need to perform precise work with the personal files of warrant officers. The fact is that a personal file is the basic document of a serviceman's personal record and if it is not made out or is sent late, people are placed in a difficult material position, and moral damage is done to them as well.

This issue cannot be considered closed for now. The journal will continue to speak out against bureaucratism, red tape and an indifferent attitude toward warrant officers. We hope that the commanders, staffs, and political and personnel entities will not remain aloof from this work.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Responses to Lovesick Serviceman

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 18

[Editorial commentary: "'I Want to be Happy...']

[Text] A letter from WO [Michman] V. Grinev was published under that title in the March issue of the journal. The author told how, on meeting a girl during leave, he fell in love with her and decided to leave service because Svetlana refused to travel with him to Kamchatka. One thing troubled him: his term of obligation had not expired. "Just what am I to do? Give me advice," he asked, "Lose a loved one and choose service and then feel unhappy the rest of my life?"

This letter generated much mail from the readers. Officers, warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany], their wives and fiancees, and first-term soldiers are writing in. The editors already published some of the responses in the May issue of the journal, but the readers continue the discussion about allegiance and duty, about love and career, and about what happiness is...

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Advice for the Woman

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84)
pp 18-19

[Letter by Anna Malykh: "A Different Career Isn't Necessary"]

[Text] Dear editors! I read WO Grinev's letter and the responses to it. I myself decided to write and share my thoughts and life experience. Only I don't want to address Viktor, but his promised one, Svetlana. It is easier for me as a woman to speak with her and it is simpler for her to understand me, if of course she wishes to.

It can be said that we have an Army family. My husband is a warrant officer [praporshchik] and my brother-in-law is an officer. My husband and I have spent more than 20 years on posts. It is no secret that at times it is very difficult with my husband on duty and with me alone with the children and no conveniences.

Nevertheless, I recall our life and youth and I think that I would not have traded my fate for any other. I cherish all this and I also know that my husband is respected in service. He has not had a single punishment in 23 years of duty, and has had some 70 commendations. Perhaps this will seem immodest, but still I will say to you, Svetlana: credit for this also goes to me.

From time immemorial it has been that way: the husband is the soldier and defender; the wife is the keeper of the hearth. And were my husband to indulge in a wife's caprices and forget about service, I would cease to respect him.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Advice for the Serviceman

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 29

[Letter by WO G. Rybakov: "The Reader Continues the Discussion: What Happiness is Desired?"]

[Text] My wife and I read WO Grinev's letter. We have been together for nine years now, although for military people the word "together" is a relative concept. Judge for yourselves. I was called up for active military duty in November 1976, at which time I already was married. I served initially in a training subunit in the Turkestan District, then in the Baltic.

My wife left studies and people near and dear and traveled there from Kherson. There was neither an apartment nor work. It was an unfamiliar city, but she found strength in herself and didn't lose her head. Soon everything appeared: a job, registration, and an apartment. It is true that it was a private apartment. Later I studied in a warrant officer school far from home and was sent to the Northern Group of Forces.

My wife remained with our daughter, who was two years old.

In May 1979 we came together again and were not parted after that. Now I again serve in the Turkestan Military District. My wife also is with me, and we already have big children: a daughter seven and a son four. Not once did I hear words of reproach from my wife for the "lost youthful years" or for the fact that she saw nothing except garrison clubs. To the contrary, I constantly sense her support.

Yes, there are difficulties as well, but we overcome them because we are together, because we understand each other and because I love my wife and I love my work. This is my happiness.

What does WO Grinev take the word "happiness" to mean? Judging from his letter, it is a small house far from the mundane bustle, a little garden, fruit trees and a beloved wife nearby. Neither worries nor cares--an idyll. But this is a narrow kind of happiness.

I wouldn't want to remind the warrant officer of common truths and talk about the regulations, the oath and duty. If he hoped to be pitied, it was to no avail. There is no cause for pity. We remember well the words from the song: "Think first about the Motherland and then about yourself..." And we remember the 20 million human lives which the war took from us and the fact that the situation in the world now is tense.

WO Grinev, it seems to me, also should be thinking about this, and about the fact that a real soldier doesn't come from a person with a weak character. With regard to Svetlana, I believe she simply was frightened by the difficulties. That is the value of her love. She never will become a real friend.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

A Married Couple's Advice

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 29

[Letter by WO [Praporshchik] Mukhtarov and his wife: "People Love Men With Character"]

[Text] My husband and I read WO V. Grinev's letter together, and here is our opinion.

Mukhtarova, a warrant officer's [praporshchik's] wife:

There was much that seemed strange to me in Viktor Grinev's letter to the editors. Why does he draw such a categorical conclusion that on being released to the reserve he will be of greater benefit than in the Navy? Aren't specialists of his profile really needed aboard ship? And further.

As a woman, it seems to me that if there is no agreement between a boy and girl, then there is also no love between them. What kind of love is it if

they are not yet even married but already are looking for where it is more profitable and they can't give in to each other?

Does Viktor know how many wives of officers and warrant officers aren't working in their specialty? I too can't name the exact figure but I think there are very many such people. They were summoned by love and they share hardships and adversities with their loved ones where the Motherland calls their husbands to serve.

And the very last point. One gets the impression that Grinev simply wishes to get out of military service and is looking for an excuse to do this, and that the girl loves him and is ready to go with him even to Kamchatka.

WO Mukhtarov:

The situation in which WO Grinev ended up is not rare. Who among us did not encounter something similar in our youthful years? The absence of life experience is the most nutritive soil for confusion here.

I have served in the native Soviet Army for 22 years now and I am very happy. My Army has strengthened and grown, and I have come to manhood with it. I gained experience, acquired knowledge and became a master of military affairs. I am respected and esteemed in the collective. How can one not be proud of this?

I also have a family: three children. My oldest son is preparing to become an officer. My wife was my primary support and first assistant in my affairs no matter where fate cast us.

I wish to advise Comrade Grinev not to deviate from his chosen path or shirk difficulties. He has to temper his character. Loved ones go even to the ends of the earth after real men.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

More Advice

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 29

[Various letters: "Lines from Letters"]

[Text] I am 21 years old and I have a loved one. He soon will finish military school. We decided to link our destiny forever and I will follow him even to the ends of the earth despite the fact that I too have my favorite specialty. Serving the Motherland is the priority duty for each of us. What can be more important than this now when it is so restless in the world?

Olya A.

Unfortunately WO Grinev doesn't write what his girl plans to become after completing the institute, but I think that if she is a real Komsomol member she must not fear difficulties, especially next to a loved one. There are no places in our country where a person wouldn't be able to find himself. In my opinion, she simply became accustomed to home and parental coddling and doesn't wish to part with all this. It also seems to me that a person must be happy with his work; then his love will be happy. Check out your feelings and don't be hasty. Be a man. Then both a girl and a future wife will be proud of you.

Extended-Term Sr Sgt V. Yefimova

I don't like WO Grinev's position. I don't think he will ever be happy because he has no pride in his work. And who will guarantee that on being released to the reserve he will change his life as he would like it?

When Marina and I decided to wed we were not frightened by the fact that there was nowhere to live or that she continued to study in the institute. Now all that is behind us. We have everything and we are very happy. Now there are two waiting for me when I come back from the sea.

No, WO Grinev isn't standing firmly on his two feet. He is like an autumn leaf: he blows with the wind. This is sad.

WO D. Konofol'skiy

One gets the impression that Grinev wishes to get out of the difficulties of military duty. Of course, it is easier to serve two out of three years as a warrant officer and not a seaman, and so he is cunning. Many of us were sent off to the Army by girls, and some of them didn't wait for us. This only means that it was not real love.

Group of Servicemen of Unit "X,"
Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops in
Afghanistan

It is good that work in the specialty is so dear to Svetlana. It is understandable that she has studied her favorite trade for several years and the desire to work in her calling is fully natural. On the other hand, however, I begin to doubt whether or not she loves Viktor.

WO K. Pankratov

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Control Point Duty Deficiencies

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial commentary: "'Shame Isn't Smoke...']

[Text] The article by that title published in the journal's second issue for 1984 criticized some appointed persons of Unit "X" for deficiencies and omissions in the organization of troop duty and for poor indoctrinal work with persons on the daily detail.

The article by our journal correspondent Yu. Konorov mentioned in particular the immoral acts of WO [Praporshchik] M. Vekshin, who arranged a drinking bout during duty at the KPP [traffic control point] and who sought "protection" from the editors against the just punishment the commander imposed on him.

The editors received an official response signed by Lt Gen Engr Trps M. Morkovin. The facts had been confirmed and the criticism was deemed proper. Warrant officers M. Vekshin and V. Polunov and Pvt A. Mozharov, who were the immediate violators of military discipline and of the rules for performing duty at the KPP, were made answerable for disciplinary, party and Komsomol responsibility.

The content of the article was made known to soldiers who perform duty at the KPP. Quizzes were given to the privates, NCO's and warrant officers on a knowledge of the USSR Armed Forces Interior Service Regulation. In addition, the facts presented in the article were examined at a command-political conference as well as at party and Komsomol meetings. Additional steps were taken to increase the responsibility of commanders and political officers for the status of guard and interior services.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Needed House Repairs Scheduled

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial commentary: "'But the Issue is not Being Resolved']

[Text] A letter from WO [Praporshchik] G. Vasil'chenko was published under that title in the February 1984 issue of ZNAMENOSETS to the effect that the house where he lives has not had a single repair since 1953. The roof leaks, the ceiling is deteriorating, the facing of exterior walls has loosened or burst, and the heating system has become unserviceable.

As the editors were informed by Col A. Dolgov, deputy chief of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District Billeting Directorate, the article was discussed in the district KEU [billetting directorate]. The chief of the rayon Volgograd KECh [billetting unit] was instructed to repair the house in the second quarter of 1984.

A letter also was received from the commander of the unit in which WO Vasil'chenko serves. It states that the house in question as well as other residences of the same type were inspected by representatives of the Volgograd KECh. It was decided to repair the heating system and roof and perform other necessary work.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Deficient Komsomol Work Improved

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial commentary: "The Situation is Improving"]

[Text] Junior sergeants V. Losev and G. Sergeyev wrote the editors that for several months now no Komsomol meetings, mass cultural activities or athletic activities have been held in the unit where they serve and that the activeness of Komsomol members in organizing young people's leisure time has reduced. The Komsomol organization secretary ceased to react to suggestions and the initiative of Komsomol committee and buro members, and some of them had begun to commit infractions of military discipline.

Maj Gen A. Ovcharenko, deputy chief of the Red Banner Odessa Military District Political Directorate, informed the editors of the steps taken in response to this letter. The facts presented by the author did occur. The Komsomol organization in question really does devote little attention to intraleague [Komsomol] life, shows insufficient initiative in conducting mass sports work and organizing the leisure time of Komsomol members and non-Komsomol youth, and it performs little propaganda of the best athletes' achievements. Participants of amateur talent activities have stopped attending classes.

Lt V. Ledenev was given a severe reprimand through party channels for deficiencies in the Komsomol organization's work. The secretary of the primary party organization was given strict instructions about poor direction of the Komsomol organization.

Political department officers studied the state of affairs locally, briefed the activists and gave assistance to the party and Komsomol organizations on the issues noted by the authors of the letter to the editors. Now the situation has improved. Komsomol meetings are held regularly, athletic and mass cultural activities are organized regularly and discipline is being strengthened.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Delayed Release Punished

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial commentary: "Indifference was Punished"]

[Text] After serving more than 30 years Sr WO [Praporshchik] Ye. Grigor'yev decided to go into the reserve. He submitted a request through channels and the commander promised to satisfy it. After several months the serviceman inquired into how the matter of his release was being decided. It turned out that his request had been lost. He wrote a new one and his personal file was sent to the personnel entity. Much time passed but he received no response. Then he turned to ZNAMENOSETS. The editors sent his letter to the commander, who answered neither the author nor us. Soon Grigor'yev's wife wrote the journal on the same question: "Just when will they finally release my husband?"

Lt Gen A. Kolinichenko, first deputy chief of the Red Banner Far East Military District Political Directorate, announced that Sr WO Grigor'yev had been released to the reserve. The delay in his release occurred through the fault of officers V. Tarasov and Ye. Tokarev, who procrastinated in drawing up the documents. They were reprimanded by order of the higher command element. Comrade A. Tyurin was given strict instructions for the crude violation of demands of the CPSU Central Committee and minister of defense on working with letters. The facts about red tape in examining letters, complaints and petitions were made known to all unit commanders and their political deputies.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Pay Problems Resolved

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial commentary: "Relieved of Position"]

[Text] WO [Praporshchik] V. Popovich was not able to receive his pay for April 1983 during a transfer from the Southern Group of Forces. The serviceman wrote the unit commander and turned to the editors without waiting for an answer.

We sent the warrant officer's first letter to the higher command element for examination, but three months went by since then and the author was not told of steps which were taken. Then he wrote the editors again.

It was learned from a letter from Maj Gen A. Bilenko, first deputy chief of the Southern Group of Forces Political Directorate, that the reason for late payment of salary to Comrade Popovich was that Lt S. Il'chenko lost Popovich's deposit book. The money due was sent to the warrant officer by postal money order as a result of steps which were taken.

Officer Il'ichenko was relieved of his position for this and other instances of red tape in drawing up appropriate documents.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Basis for Award Clarified

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial reply to WO [Praporshchik] D. Pavlov: "You Asked and We Answer"]

[Text] You are interested in the following matter: Does service in the Internal Security Forces of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] count toward the overall length of service for recommending warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] for award of the "Faultless Duty" medal 1st, 2d and 3d class?

As we were told in the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate, duty in the USSR MVD Internal Security Forces is included in the overall length of service in recommending warrant officers for award of the "Faultless Duty" medal.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

Emergency Leave Procedures Clarified

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 19

[Editorial reply to WO [Praporshchik] V. Osipov: "You Asked and We Answer"]

[Text] You received a telegram which informed you that your father was in a serious condition. The telegram was certified by the chief physician of the rayon hospital and the telegraph operator. The unit commander granted you a short leave for family circumstances. The higher headquarters said that the telegram had to be certified by the military commissar as well, but the commissar refused to do this. "Did the military commissar act correctly?" you asked.

The military commissar acted correctly. He certifies telegrams addressed only to first-term servicemen. With respect to officers and warrant officers the unit commander grants them a short leave for specially valid reasons and appropriate documents are drawn up on the basis of this decision. That is what should have been done in your case as well.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

ARMED FORCES

SOCIOMETRIC STUDY OF PLATOON YIELDS APPLICABLE RESULTS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84)
pp 20-24

[Article by WO [Praporshchik] V. Stanotin based on experience of indoctrinal work as a platoon commander, and commentary by political officer N. Kozlovskiy: "Military Discipline: See Everyone and Influence Each One: Reading a Book of the Hearts"]

[Text] WO V. Stanotin, party member and commander of a motor vehicle repair platoon, is an enthusiastic person. No matter what he takes up, he does everything diligently and conscientiously and puts a bit of his heart into each job. He thinks about how to achieve the best end results and greatest effectiveness. Viktor Petrovich is the author of more than 60 innovative suggestions which provided solid economy. The best of the projects were demonstrated at the USSR VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy]. Several plants put out products based on his designs.

It was about party members like him that it was said at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that they influence the views and attitudes of people not only by word, but also by their attitude toward work, and that they set genuine examples of selfless service to the interests of the people and the party's ideals.

Two years ago Stanotin took over a backward platoon and took it into the ranks of foremost by skillfully applying recommendations of military pedagogics and psychology in the practice of indoctrinal work. How was this done? What forms and methods of studying people and influencing them did he use? WO Stanotin himself tells about all this.

As chief of an outstanding team and member of the party buro, I received an unusual suggestion a week before the next training year began. The commander invited me in, and the political officer was there as well.

"Comrade Stanotin, how would you look on it if we proposed that you take over the motor vehicle repair platoon?" asked the commander. "You know that the situation in it is poor."

Yes, I as well as other officers and warrant officers knew about affairs in the motor vehicle repair platoon from more than hearsay. At the morning parade we often would learn about the latest infraction of discipline which occurred there. A difficult contingent had assembled in the logistical sub-unit; moreover, the platoon also hadn't been fortunate with commanders. It was something to ponder.

As a military person I realized well that a commander's suggestion is the very same as an order. But I have rather little experience, having served as a warrant officer for less than five years. Nevertheless, I agreed without unnecessary words.

"That's fine," he said, smiling. "You can count on our full support..."

And the political officer added:

"Viktor Petrovich, consider that taking the platoon out of the breach is your primary party assignment."

The very first familiarity with the platoon and the first meeting caused me no joy. It was difficult to talk with the soldiers. I told them about plans for improving everyday arrangements, renovating shops and elevating the role and authority of repair workers in the eyes of the entire collective. I stressed that they would be required to have high discipline, to observe regulation requirements and to have outstanding grades in combat and political training subjects. I emphasized that any diligence or a substantial contribution to the common cause would be noted and encouraged to the full extent of rights granted a commander. But my words evoked no response in the soldiers.

One sensed that the people did not especially believe what I said, and this was confirmed by Pvt S. Gritsayev's remarks.

"It isn't harmful to dream, Comrade Warrant Officer," he said. "We already have heard so many promises here, but... Which commander are you by count? The fifth, and I think you are not the last..."

I already had encountered such an attitude. At the plant where I worked at one time I was appointed foreman of a lagging sector and soon took it out of the breach. A common job and common concerns rallied the collective, and that is what I hoped for now.

Time was needed to thoroughly study the people, the strong and weak points of their character, their habits and inclinations, the official and unofficial ties within the collective, and their sympathies and antipathies, as required by the regulations... But the training year was beginning and we were making pledges, both individual and general.

I spoke on behalf of the platoon at a meeting of the unit personnel and told about our plans and that we intended to move into the ranks of foremost. My subordinates heard this. The bridges were burned, as the saying goes, and there was nowhere to retreat.

I learned from individual conversations, from an analysis of the platoon's state of affairs and from a conversation with the commander and political officer that the people lacked common concerns, which damped their ardor... I didn't know who could take over the performance of a particular task or on whom I could rely. I didn't know where there would be concerted, coordinated work and where there again would be conflicts. What could I do?

I held an individual talk with each soldier to study his moral and job qualities and to learn his biography, the make-up of his family and its material situation, and the soldier's way of life before the Army. I wrote letters to all parents in which I asked what ailments their son had, whether or not he had had injuries, what he liked to do in his free time, whether or not he had friends and who they were. I inquired as to the mother and father's wishes, what character traits had to be developed in the lad and which ones had to be neutralized. In addition, each day I observed the soldiers' relationships and their performance of duties. I analyzed this and entered my thoughts in a notebook.

But still, all this information was not enough. Then, relying on pedagogics and psychology, I performed an experiment in the platoon for the purpose of identifying interpersonal relationships. I assembled everyone and said:

"Imagine that I must send you off to perform an important assignment in groups of three or four persons. I wish to make up the groups with consideration of your desires. To do this, each of you will write his last name as well as the names of those three soldiers with whom you would like to go on the assignment. You will name the person who could head up the group and one of those in whom you have faith and on whom, in your opinion, you can rely at a difficult moment. The order of the entry will be in the order of preference. Explain why you chose this person."

In addition, I added:

"Considering that I possibly will not be able to satisfy all your requests, indicate especially with whom you would not like to perform the assignment and also explain why. Except for me, no one will find out whom you are writing about."

The method I employed is called a sociometric method. It is presented in a psychology textbook. The format of the "sociocard" sheets is shown on the next page.

Everyone responded to my suggestion because it contains an element of a game and in youth everyone willingly participates in it. I fully kept the promise to keep the content of the "sociocards" a secret to avoid undesirable consequences. I tell about them only now when all those mentioned in them already have been released to the reserve.

Sociocard

Criteria	Names of Those Selected												Rejected
	1.	2.	3.	0.									
1. Form a group to carry out an assignment													
Reasons for selection or rejection													
2. Which one of these could head the group and why?													
3. To which comrade in the group would you turn at a difficult time & why?													

Sociomatrix

No	Military Rank, Month & Year of Call-up	Last Name, Initials	Selected or Rejected												
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1	St Sgt	Mostovoy, A. N.	May 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
2	Pvt	Baranov, S.P.	May 81	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
3	Pvt	Gritsayev, S.V.	May 81	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
4	Pvt	Nazaryuk, N.M.	May 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
5	Pvt	Gabdukayev, M.G.	May 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
6	Sgt	Nashchenko, V.F.	May 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
7	Pvt	Medvedev, S.V.	May 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
8	Pvt	Gordyeyev, A.P.	Nov 81	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
9	Pvt	Osipov, N.V.	Nov 81	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
10	Sgt	Kotov, Yu.V.	Nov 81	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
11	Pvt	Kurenkov, M.I.	May 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
12	Pvt	Sergeyev, P.N.	Nov 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
13	Pvt	Kirimov, V.I.	Nov 82	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
14	Total selections			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
15	I		1	1	1	3	3	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
16	II		2	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1
17	III		3	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	1
18	Who heads group		8	7	1	3	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1
19	Whose help sought		11	1	2	1	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	1
20	Mutual selections		10	3	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
21	Rejected		10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
22	Mutual rejections		10	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
23	POINTS		21	8	17	16	7	10	9	10	1	2	13	4	0

people relied at a difficult moment, who received a mutual selection or who were denoted with the letter "B" also received a point. One point was deducted for mutual exclusion or simply a refusal to be accepted in a group.

I had the following result from the simple calculations: deputy platoon commander Sr Sgt A. Mostovoy received 21 points, Pvt S. Baranov got 8,

Later I again held a talk with each soldier and asked why he chose or rejected a particular soldier.

Based on the cards I drew up a special table called a "sociomatrix." The figures "1," "2," "3" denoted the order of preference in the selection and the symbol "0" indicated a lack of desire to be together. The letter "B" denoted those who were proposed as group leaders and the letter "Pi" denoted those to whom people would turn for help at a difficult moment. Those figures which indicated a mutual choice were circled and those indicating mutual rejection are shown in a square.

Three points were given for a first position in a choice, two points for second and one point for third. Each person on whom

Pvt S. Gritsayev 17, Pvt M. Gabdukayev received minus 7, Pfc M. Kurenkov got 13 and Pvt V. Kirillov received zero points...

Using the "sociomatrix," one can draw up a plan for indoctrinal work in the platoon and identify the growth prospects for the Komsomol organization and the reserve of future NCO's. If a soldier receives several "B's" it makes sense to make him into a commander, for the soldiers already have recognized leadership qualities in him. The letter "П" signifies that in the future a soldier may become a Komsomol activist, agitator or operational newsheet editor. It is desirable to recommend a person who received both a "B" and a "П" as Komsomol bureau secretary.

Looking at the "sociomatrix," it is easy to notice that my deputy, Sr Sgt Mostovoy, received the greatest number of points. This was pleasing, as there was someone on whom I could rely in the work. It is even more gratifying that he was unconditionally recognized as a leader in the platoon both along official and unofficial lines. He was suggested as a group leader seven times. By the way, there weren't that many pretenders to this role: only four. Among them was Pvt Gritsayev with three votes, Sgt Mashchenko with two and Sgt Kotov with one.

It is interesting that Gritsayev, an unofficial leader in the collective, outstripped the official leaders, the squad commanders, in this indicator. In the number of points accumulated he is in second place immediately behind Mostovoy. Why?

First of all, for his directness. He could tell anyone to his face what he thought of him. This is highly esteemed in the midst of young people. By the way, he was the one who told me at the meeting: "It isn't harmful to dream, Comrade Warrant Officer." Secondly, Sergey was an outstanding specialist, an automobile engine mechanic who had completed a teknikum before the Army. And thirdly, he was distinguished by a very conscientious attitude toward his duties. Gritsayev's vehicle was the one which received the best care.

It is true that the soldier's character also had negative traits: for example, his quick temper and, I would say, a kind of heightened resistance. There are such people. You assign them to do something and they immediately bristle: why me and not another? It is true that afterwards they do everything excellently and faultlessly, but an unpleasant aftertaste will be left in the heart and one's tongue no longer will move to say a good word to them and encourage them. But it was necessary to reckon with these deficiencies as well, relying on the positive aspects and directing Pvt Gritsayev's abilities, energy and leadership toward rallying the collective, strengthening discipline in the platoon and renovating the shops.

"We'll dream and work together, Sergey," I said to him once.

Let's continue an analysis of the data obtained as a result of the experiment.

Let's turn attention to the column "rejected." It included five persons: Pvt Nazaryuk (by the way, he had 16 positive points), Pvt Gabdukayev (with six

rejections and minus 7 points), as well as Pvt Gordeyev for his partiality to alcohol, Pvt Osipov (he also had his reason, which I will discuss later), and Sgt Kotov (one rejection).

I was placed on guard by the case of Pvt Gabdukayev. Why was the collective alienated?

I believe the reasons here lay in the soldier's habits and character. He was untidy. He was the youngest in a family of seven brothers and sisters and became accustomed to having everyone care for him and worry about him. And here in the platoon he couldn't even sew on a button and had to be accustomed to doing this. Another character trait was laziness and a desire to get out of work under any pretext. Either he would request permission to go to the medical point because of a trifling scratch and would disappear there the entire day, or he would settle down in a secluded corner of the motor pool and we would run our legs off in locating him. All this of course gave rise to a dislike for Gabdukayev in his comrades.


That is how I analyzed official and unofficial interpersonal relationships in the platoon from soldier to soldier, studied the platoon's "inner world," as the saying goes, the presence of "leaders" and "exceptions," and the reasons for and trends in the appearance of both, determined my place in this complicated system, the factors on which I could rely and those phenomena which had to be avoided or neutralized if possible. In short, I clarified all those facts which the regulation demands that we know and based on which I as a platoon commander would have to arrange the work.

I will make a small digression. By using the sociometric method I was able to understand the situation very quickly. I repeat this technique regularly once every half-year, especially when young privates arrive. I give them time to look around--a month or month and a half--and I conduct the experiment. This also helps me clarify the results of my indoctrinal influences as well as those trends which appear in relations among soldiers and which require the intervention of a commander or Komsomol organization. This information is objective and independent of the mood of a particular soldier. When you have some 20 questionnaires you can trust that there will be no mistake.

But let's return to the "sociomatrix." I drew for myself one other chart--calling it a "sociogram"--for graphic effect so that a person doesn't have to rack his brain over particular interrelationships. I placed a person on a specific circle depending on his place in the military collective and the number of points he collected. I drew a line from him to other soldiers according to their selections, desires and exceptions.

The leaders, who received the greatest number of selections, entered into the first circle, those who received from 25 to 75 percent of the selections went into the second circle, persons who received up to 25 percent of the selections entered the third, those who received "0" and had selections went into the fourth, those who received no selections entered the fifth, and the sixth circle included those indicated as undesirable and who didn't receive any selections.

Sociogram



Privates were denoted by a small circle and NCO's by a small square. Each squad had its own color: blue, red, black. This additionally helped depict relationships within a squad and beyond it. Mutual selections were denoted by a red line. One-way selections were denoted by a blue line with an arrow toward the person who was selected. A one-way exclusion was denoted by a black line with an arrow toward the person who was rejected. Mutual exclusion was denoted by a dotted line.

Here is what I ended up with. There was a mutual choice and trust among Sr Sgt Mostovoy, Sgt Mashchenko, Pfc Kurenkov and Pvt Sergeyev. Mikhail Kurenkov was one of those who gathered the largest number of points--13. He

is in the second circle. He doesn't have the greatest authority as a reliable and trusty friend. Let's ponder why.

Talks with the soldiers (what the regulation calls personal contact) as well as the "sociocards" and "sociomatrix" helped me find this out. Let's have a look at the "sociomatrix." Sr Sgt Mostovoy selects Kurenkov and puts him in second place after Mashchenko, his close friend. Mostovoy is respected by Sgt Mashchenko. Sgt Kotov gives him the first line and relies on his help at a difficult minute. Pvt Sergeyev emphasizes the very same. Kurenkov has not a single rejection.

All of this is no accident. Mikhail is a frank, open person, he is attracted to social work and is an outstanding specialist. Before the Army he worked as an electrician at a plant. A battery room assigned to him is like having a sure thing, as the saying goes. Such diligent, responsible and skilled persons always are respected in a youthful environment. In addition, the Pfc is a very sociable soldier and ready to do everything in his ability for the platoon. He went home on leave for a sad reason--his brother died on an expedition--but he found time to drop in at his own plant and the Komsomol committee. Later he brought an entire suitcase of cutting tools for the lathe from there.

"A sponsor's assistance from plant Komsomol members," he said.

And so feature by feature the job and moral make-up of Pfc Kurenkov was depicted for me and the foundations of his authority in the collective became understandable.

Who is an authority for Kurenkov himself and to whom is he attracted? I was helped in learning this by the "sociogram." It was Sr Sgt A. Mostovoy (there is a red line between them, a mutual selection) and privates A. Gordeyev and S. Baranov. The sources of friendship between Mikhail and Sergey also were clear to me. Both were from the city and from working families. Both had completed tekhnikums and although Baranov was a whole year older than Kurenkov he never emphasized this. To the contrary, he was always distinguished by friendliness and a desire to help his comrade, and he was a surprisingly modest person.

Here is an interesting detail. Baranov is deputy secretary of the Komsomol organization headed by Sgt Kotov, but he keeps up all the documentation himself. He is the one who organizes the publication of operational newssheets and express leaflets as well as talks and meetings. He never will utter a word about carrying another's load or working for another person. He regarded this as proper. He even conceded priority without a murmur to Gritsayev, who was longing to be a leader, as the saying goes, and constantly competed with Baranov in the knowledge of vehicular equipment and in professional expertise. At the same time, however, he knew his own value, he could stand up for himself and not make up to anyone.

In short, my first group shaped up as follows: Sr Sgt Mostovoy, Sgt Mashchenko, Pfc Kurenkov, and privates Baranov and Sergeyev. I was sure that I could rely on them completely in work because of their mutual trust, mutual assistance and cohesiveness. I planned to "draw" the other soldiers up to them as well, the more so as there were objective preconditions for this. Let's have a look at the "sociogram." Pvt Medvedev is striving for them via Mostovoy (the blue arrow from the figure "7" to the figure "1"). The arrows of Sgt Kotov, Pvt Gordeyev and even Gabdukayev are directed toward the senior sergeant.

I would like to highlight the role of Pvt Medvedev in all these "undercurrents." Sergey is an outstanding welder. Before the Army he worked at a plant where they make the Izh motorcycles and in Sr Sgt Mostovoy's brigade he should work to his utmost.

And so the knowledge is there about mutual relationships in the collective, the key groups and leaders have been "articulated" and now it was necessary to begin work. An absence of common concern and common work was the reason for infractions of military discipline, as I had discussed with the commander and political officer. Our primary task was to restore the workshop, and we directed our efforts toward that.

During the day we would work on combat and political training like all the soldiers and in the evening we would whitewash walls and ceilings, paint doors and windows and prepare foundations for the machine tools. In addition, we made drawings and calculations and thought over what we would place where.

By the way, inasmuch as I primarily will be talking about the workshop and the jobs connected with it (this is of course our military specialty) I now would like to highlight the role of drill training. This is what helped us at first

in fighting the "old-timer" ways of some soldiers, including privates Gritsayev and Gordeyev and Sgt Kotov. Each morning we would have training where everyone had an equal load, or the experienced ones even had a somewhat greater load. If you are better able to do something, then show a junior comrade how to perform a particular drill technique correctly, and don't do it once or twice, but until you are understood.

We gave much attention to platoon drill training. I myself or Sr Sgt Mostovoy would direct it. We made it a mandatory rule to have all soldiers present for it and we followed this strictly. Each day we "beat" the asphalt with the boots, as the saying goes, until we learned to march in formation precisely, handsomely and dashingly. The platoon took first place in the unit at the last inspection parade and we were entrusted with being the color platoon and with accompanying the colors. For a logistical subunit to attain that honor is very distinguished.

In addition, drill training on its own solidifies people and generates in them a feeling of being one with the collective, a feeling of unity, and there is also pride in common success--all this of course helped strengthen discipline in the platoon.

But let's return to the workshop. Its basis is a machine shop. Of course, a shop is a conditional concept. It is rather a section, but that is what we called it and there was meaning in this. For now only a lathe without a motor was standing there, but the commander already was looking into a milling machine, drill press, grinder and equipment for bench work. Everything had to be obtained from the depot and installed and the key group headed by Sr Sgt Mostovoy began work in earnest.

We were leading electrical power to the tools, setting them up and adjusting them. Each person had something to do--Sgt Mashchenko, Pfc Kurenkov, and privates Baranov, Sergeyev and Medvedev--all of them together. This took a rather large amount of time and much effort and nerves, but by Soviet Army and Navy Day I was able to report to the commander that the machine shop had started up. Each person who took part in the work and who had put his own initiative and heart into it was commended. A letter of thanks was sent to the parents of Sr Sgt Mostovoy to the village of Yelenovka, Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. Pvt S. Medvedev was encouraged by being given a leave. Privates Baranov and Sergeyev as well as Pfc Kurenkov were commended.

Here is an interesting detail. When I commended Pvt Baranov for the first time he blushed from embarrassment. He wasn't used to commendations. It was the very same for the others. At that time I told them:

"Don't be embarrassed to be good; you must be embarrassed to be bad."

When Pvt Medvedev planned to go on leave soldiers in the adjacent subunits asked our people:

"What's with him? Has a misfortune befallen him at home?"

"No," responded the repairmen, "he was commanded."

The others shook their heads in surprise. They didn't believe that such a thing was possible in our platoon. For me this was a very important albeit small victory for a fundamental break in the psychology of always being laggards which had formed in the people.

I wish to emphasize in particular the role of commendation in strengthening military discipline. It is written in the regulations that a commander "is obligated to encourage subordinate servicemen for intelligent initiative, zeal, exploits and distinctions in service." And of course, a short leave is a major award for a soldier, especially under our conditions with the taiga all around and nowhere to go even on pass.

But I never allowed myself to command a soldier if he hadn't yet earned a good word from his immediate commander. Otherwise the NCO's authority is devaluated. He is closest of all to the soldier and one must instil respect toward him above all.

If a subordinate shows regard for an NCO's opinion and values his appraisal, then of course the authority of a warrant officer, the platoon commander (let alone the senior chief) will be indisputable for him. This would appear to be one of the cornerstones for instilling discipline.

It is the very same with the imposition of punishments. I don't understand those superiors who are in a hurry to use their power, forgetting about the collective's indoctrinal force and about the influence on a soldier of his closest comrades and colleagues. This may prove to be more effective than any reprimand. By the way, even the regulation demands that a commander make all possible use of the strength of public opinion in fighting violators.

In my view the important thing here is the following condition: not one display of initiative, zeal or conscientiousness must be ignored by the commander or let go without a friendly word or encouragement from him. And on the other hand, people must learn that not one infraction of military discipline also will go unnoticed. It will be publicized and appropriate conclusions will be drawn from it.

Not everything was going as smoothly in our platoon as it might appear at first glance. Of course, infractions of military discipline didn't cease with my taking over the position as if at the wave of a magic wand. Successes do not come of themselves; they are achieved by labor.

I recall when the platoon was planning to go to the city for a long-awaited tour to a museum of local lore. This was an event for the soldiers, only it took some two hours to get to it by buses and the commander would authorize it on condition of high results in combat training and firm military discipline. Finally we won that right. That evening the repairmen were ironing their parade walking-out uniforms and cleaning boots until they gleamed, then suddenly at the last moment it was discovered that our comrade, Pvt A. Gordeyev, had violated discipline.

I immediately reported this through channels and the soldier of course was punished. But how could it be done so that at the same time this fact would have a specific indoctrinal effect on him?

I consulted with the commander and then took a look at the "sociogram" to see who was an indisputable authority in the platoon for the soldier and to whom he was attracted. It turned out that it was Pvt S. Gritsayev (the red line--mutual selection), Pvt S. Medvedev and Pvt N. Nazaryuk (he placed them in the 2d and 3d positions respectively in the "sociocard"). I had a chat with them and also talked with soldiers from the so-called reserve (those who were drawn to Gordeyev): privates S. Baranov and N. Osipov and Pfc M. Kurenkov, whose attention he of course valued. That same day a Komsomol meeting was held in the platoon.

I won't set forth who said what there. I can say one thing: Gordeyev expected rebukes on my part (that is the platoon commander's duty) and from Sgt Mostovoy (one sensed that Andrey had no particular liking for him because of his weak will and liking for alcohol. By the way, this also was apparent in the "sociogram": the senior sergeant gave the only rejection to Gordeyev). But of course he didn't expect angry, stern words from Gritsayev, Nazaryuk and Medvedev as well as from Kurenkov and Baranov. They made a strong impression on him.

The result of the meeting was that until the end of his duty in the platoon Pvt Gordeyev didn't violate discipline.

It stands to reason that it wasn't a matter of a one-time measure or one and only serious conversation with the soldier. The collective continued to exert an indoctrinal effect on him which was comprehensive and constant. My correspondence with Gordeyev's family also helped. Aleksandr is married and he was raising a daughter. But the important thing was that I as the commander relied on the influence of the Komsomol organization as required by the regulation and thanks to the "sociogram" I knew specifically through whom to influence the soldier and how. This would appear to me to be most important. What happened was what is called in engineering the "fulcrum effect."

The indoctrination of soldiers, making the collective cohesive and strengthening military discipline and order in it went on continuously and above all in close unity with the work of restoring the workshop, with combat training and with fulfillment of the command's assignments. We started up the machine shop, finished outfitting the forging and welding shop and installed equipment in the electrical shop. A separate brigade worked in each section. One of them was headed by Sgt Mashchenko and another by Sgt Kotov. By the way, he led the electrical wiring to all the machine tools, put the lighting in everywhere, adjusted the automatic equipment and also was one of the first to be rewarded with a short leave. Sr Sgt Mostovoy exercised overall direction, but the platoon had yet another leader who could have headed a responsible sector. This was Pvt Gritsayev.

After studying the "sociogram" and "sociomatrix" I concluded that he would work best together with privates Nazaryuk and Gordeyev (mutual selections). Sergey had put Gordeyev in first place and counted on his help in a difficult moment. Gritsayev also was drawn to Mostovoy. Privates Baranov, Sergeyev and Osipov wanted to work with him (in his selection Baranov put him in first place and believes that he can head up a group. Sergeyev also put him in first place and Osipov put him in second place after Gordeyev, but he also gives him a "management post"), so the brigade would function successfully. It contains welders, motor vehicle mechanics, carpenters and machine tool specialists. They would be capable of handling any section.

By forming the brigade in this manner I pursued certain indoctrinal goals in addition to purely production tasks. First of all, to give Gritsayev an opportunity to use his knowledge and skills and of course his leadership qualities with benefit for the common cause; secondly, to assist Gordeyev in restoring his good name in the collective after that memorable misdeed through shock work and diligence. And thirdly, to reveal the positive qualities of Pvt N. Osipov to colleagues.

It is quite apparent from the "sociomatrix" that Osipov received three rejections--from that same Pvt Gritsayev, from Sgt Mashchenko and from Pfc Kurenkov. This also is confirmed by the "sociogram"--the black arrows toward the figure "9." Why?

This was no great secret to me. Pvt Nikolay Osipov held the position of driver and had a license, but he didn't know the vehicle and wasn't able to drive it. A defect in the work of the DOSAAF rayon department was the reason. In a collective where each person had mastered some kind of working specialty, such professional lack of competence was not forgiven.

The attitude toward Osipov also was influenced by an incident in an exercise when he tried to pull out Pvt Gritsayev's Ural, stuck in a washout, with a winch from the GAZ-66 vehicle. This undertaking ended poorly--the cable broke and shattered the vehicle's windshield. Although no one was hurt I had to punish the soldier severely both for the breakage and, most important, for technical ignorance.

What was positive in this matter was that Gritsayev was filled with sympathy for Osipov, for the latter had "suffered" because of Gritsayev and because of his desire to help a comrade. Suddenly he became friends with Nikolay and began to help him learn the vehicle. Matters got on an even keel, as the saying goes. I tried to reinforce this positive trend by including them in the same group.

Of course, we didn't get by without rough edges. Gritsayev would play tricks on Osipov and the latter would take offense at him rather often. But Kurenkov assumed the role of a kind of "buffer" at my assignment. He was able to smooth over their minor conflicts. And I as a commander, while going into the reasons for successes and blunders in the process of work and in summing up its results, would try to emphasize everything good contained and manifested

in Pvt Osipov's character: diligence, an obliging nature, and conscientiousness. At the same time I would tactfully correct Gritsayev, damp his ardor, and teach him to manage people calmly, without noise or superfluous rebukes. I would emphasize that they could perform the mission only in close coordination.

And so research within the collective was reinforced by daily, painstaking individual influence. I hoped that all this together would produce good results.

I am happy that I was not in error. Pvt Gritsayev's brigade successfully accomplished the assigned tasks: it installed and adjusted several machine tools and set up tool cabinets and a storeroom in the shop. It helped implement certain innovative suggestions including a mobile technical control point. In addition, it helped Pvt Osipov master a specialty and win authority in the collective.

My archives contain one other "sociomatrix" and one other "sociogram." I made them a half-year after the first experiment. There are no rejections opposite Osipov's name on the part of Gritsayev, Mashchenko and Kurenkov, and there also are no black lines from them to him.

I have to honestly admit that the results with Pvt M. Gabdukayev proved to be far from my plans. At the very first opportunity, with the consent of the commander and political officer, I had to send Gabdukayev on a long TDY. I believe Marat understood the reason for his unenviable position in the collective.

His return from TDY confirmed this. He had changed greatly, but he didn't have time to change his comrades' attitude toward himself. Many of them were released to the reserve together with him.

Yes, unfortunately, I as commander and indoctrinator was not able to help every one to the last person find his place in the collective. Not all of us became outstanding in combat and political training. But it would appear that we were not faced literally with this task. The important thing was that by the end of the training period our shop was functioning to the full extent and supported performance of any task which the command assigned us. The platoon has not had a single instance of a crude infraction of military discipline. Based on socialist competition results it took first place among logistical subunits and second place in the unit, it was declared outstanding and has held this high title for two years in a row now. I fulfilled the party assignment.

I have to stipulate that credit here goes not only to me, but to the entire collective as well--the NCO's and Komsomol activists. Our successes are the result of assistance, support and constant supervision on the part of the commander, his political deputy and the party organization. I regularly gave an account of affairs in the platoon at a session of the party buro and my senior comrades' advice meant a great deal in our development.

Nevertheless I would like to return to the methodology of the "sociocards," "sociomatrices" and "sociograms" which books on pedagogics and psychology suggested to me. They were what helped me thoroughly learn the objective state of affairs in the collective, the soldiers' interpersonal relationships and their specific moral-political, job and moral qualities. An analysis of this knowledge, strict observance of regulation requirements, and constant reliance on them together with individual talks, correspondence with parents, skillful application of measures of disciplinary influence, and the inclusion of soldiers in technical creativeness--all this together became that fulcrum which we used to achieve success.

Political Officer N. Kozlovskiy comments on the experience of WO V. Stanotin, commander of the outstanding motor vehicle repair platoon:

The value of WO Stanotin's experience lies in the reliance on science and on the methodology of indoctrinal work in the military collective recommended by modern military pedagogics and psychology. The party requires us to tie in the achievements of science closely with the tasks of building communism and indoctrinating a citizen of a socialist society. This thought can be traced through resolutions of all the last CPSU central committee plenums.

The warrant officer's close ties with the commander, political officer, and the party and Komsomol organizations also is a positive point in his experience. Another positive point is the fact that based on a study of interpersonal relationships in the platoon and a thorough analysis of positive and negative qualities in a soldier's character and of his sympathies and antipathies the warrant officer tries to see everything good contained in a person and, relying on this, he conducts active individual work with subordinates. He does this not only himself, but he also includes the NCO's and Komsomol activists. He indoctrinates the soldier as the regulation requires it: within the collective and through the collective.

And here is one more important detail in Viktor Petrovich's experience to which I would like to direct attention. His methodology of indoctrinal work represents an orderly system where each element is interconnected. His knowledge of the collective and of the processes occurring within it is objective and true. This is what helps him successfully influence subordinates. The soldiers come to their commander with an open heart and he doesn't deceive their trust.

We are actively adopting WO Stanotin's experience in platoon commanders' practice. He presented a paper at the last course. We also invite Viktor Petrovich to seminars and we have held demonstration classes in his platoon.

This work is producing good results.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

ARMED FORCES

VOLKOGONOV DISCUSSES MOLDING OF 'NEW MAN'

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 May 84 pp 1-2

[Article by Lt Gen D. A. Volkogonov, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences: "To the Heights of Courage"]

[Text] A new edition of the CPSU Program is being prepared in accordance with the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. This is a most important ideological-theoretical and political party document. As Comrade K. U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted at a session of the CPSU Central Committee commission on preparing the new edition of the CPSU Program, one of the key problems of the new edition is the forming of the new man -- a harmoniously developed personality.

The party proceeds from the belief that formation of the new man is not only a most important goal, but is also a necessary condition for building communism. This also defines the scope of the tasks of communist education of youth and their education in the spirit of selfless Soviet patriotism.

Today Lt Gen D. A. Volkogonov, doctor of philosophical sciences and bearer of the Leninist Komsomol Prize, reflects on these questions.

People have honored heroes throughout the ages. They were a source of national pride, and devotion to them was passed down and legends formed from generation to generation. The English thinker of the last century, Thomas Carlyle, in his book "Heroes and the Heroic in History" claimed that only great people weave the carpet of history. Even now in the history and sociology of the West there are many advocates of the absolute role of the hero in public life. The bourgeois philosopher B. Kazens [phonetic; possibly the French philosopher Victor Cousin] in his book, "Portraits of Heroes," claims that no more than 10 persons can be named for each era who define its identity and are the spiritual movers of progress. It is not difficult to see in such ideas the barely masked essence of the elitist conception which is the historical basis for the power of a selected minority in bourgeois society.

Marxism has long demonstrated the complete lack of scientific justification and social reactionism of the theory of the "elite" or of "leaders." V. I. Lenin,

one of the true geniuses of human history, never equated heroism solely with the activity of prominent leaders.

And he was profoundly correct. The new society freed all of man's creative, intellectual and moral forces and made possible the spiritual flight of every personality. The decisive circumstance that only the people can bring forward from its midst true heroes has deep rooted causes. This act affirms the vitally important requirement for recognizing the primacy of the public over the private. People support only those heroes who link all their actions, intentions and hopes with the public good and public interest.

Millions of Soviet people remember the amazing dialogue which took place in the air several years ago between Soviet military pilots Boris Kapustin and Yuriy Yanov. Circumstances had placed before them the terrible alternative of either abandoning their falling aircraft, in which case its torpedo-like apparatus would crash into residential houses of Berlin, or of removing this deadly threat to many people at the cost of their own lives. The ground station recorder impassively confirmed that they did not waver in their decision.

Or take another example. Some time back the imprudently bold action of two young American parachutists, reminiscent of a cat and mouse game with death, was widely publicized in the West. One of the young men jumped from the door of an aircraft without a parachute, and only after several seconds did the other jump with two parachutes. The second parachutist "overtook" the first in the air (owing to his greater weight), and handed him a parachute, which the first fastened on as he continued to fall. As a result both landed safely.

An exceptional instance? Yes. An uncommon act? Of course. But in the name of what was such senseless risk necessary? Giving their due to the courageous parachutists, it most definitely must be said that their act cannot be called heroic. Actions not having a progressive social thrust, even if accomplished in an extreme situation, are not heroic.

Although human life begins at birth and ends in death, it is not like a "ring of fate," but more like a parabola, with its high point determined not by time, but by a moment, hour, or sometimes years of spiritual flight, which crowns life with a feat. Private Nikolay Anfinogenov, a Komsomol member, accomplished such a feat in Afghanistan. His homeland greatly valued this Soviet soldier's feat, conferring upon him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Look around you and imagine everyone known to you either personally or from books or people's stories who has risen to heroic heights. You will become convinced that a person's readiness to accomplish a heroic feat depends mainly on his convictions and the firmness of his attitude toward life. And in the heroic act itself the will is of decisive importance.

Everyone is strong to the extent that he is able to overcome his own weaknesses. One's own impotence is just as dangerous as an outside force. Without will the heroic is unattainable. You will become convinced of this as you become more closely acquainted with the heroic acts -- feats -- with which our life is so rich.

As we see, the heroic is always a struggle: with enemies, the unknown, stagnation, circumstances, an illness, shame, outmoded traditions, danger, etc. Therefore, a man whom we consider a hero is first of all a fighter: for truth, freedom or people's safety. The heroic act expresses, essentially, one of the methods of extending the boundaries of a person's capacity in his social and moral conduct.

The heroic is manifested in various forms. Sometimes it is a blinding flash. This is a burst of heroism. It is found not only in a military situation, but also in many peacetime situations demanding an immediate decision, intervention and action.

A burst of heroism is usually associated in the mind with feats of individual people. Budenny -- the "red horseman of the revolution;" Dzerzhinskiy -- the embodiment of revolutionary purity and implacability toward enemies; Matrosov -- the synonym for conscious self-sacrifice; Stakhonov -- a national model of selfless labor; Gagarin -- the world's first man to escape the earth's cradle into the expanses of the Universe.

Along with bursts of heroism there is also the heroism of mass, everyday work. This form of heroism is collective in nature and at times is outwardly less vivid and impressive than the burst of heroism. At times we become accustomed to and do not always notice the heroism in our everyday lives and concerns. Even space flights have become a common occurrence.

Frequently everyday trials and tribulations are more difficult for an individual or collective than a short test under exceptional circumstances. I believe that the meaning of everyday heroism is found namely in overcoming the routine and sometimes monotonous, and the ability to see tomorrow's greatness in today's small things.

Moreover, it is obvious that today young people, who are prepared as in the past for heroic risk, have become in some sense different. Their higher intellectual level and greater range of needs and interests demand something more. They place priority on the opportunity for creativity, scientific inquiry and the possibilities for greater self-affirmation and recognition. Therefore, today in order not merely to maintain, but to strengthen heroic beginnings, it is important to consider more fully the evolution of the needs of young people and their opportunities and desires.

Some in the West now claim that socialism is finding it ever more difficult to summon the heroic enthusiasm in young people which was observed in the past. For example, the American sovietologist M. Setron [phonetic] writes about this in his book, "A Meeting With the Future." Such assertions express lack of understanding of the essence of a developed socialist society.

In August 1918, V. I. Lenin, in his "Letter to the American Worker," wrote: For each hundred of our mistakes about which the bourgeoisie shout to the whole world, there are 10,000 great and heroic acts, which are all the greater and more heroic in that they are simple, unseen, and concealed within everyday life..."

These great and heroic acts are also today "concealed within everyday life." It is necessary to be able to see them.

A burst of heroism, as well as the heroism of everyday mass work, is grounded in courage. It is not necessary that every courageous person accomplish a heroic feat, but it is necessary that the one who accomplishes such a feat be a courageous person. It is impossible to imagine a heroic act without courage. Courage is not only the foundation but also the wings of a feat, of which only people who are whole and strong are capable. As I became familiar with the yellowed award citations of the past war (like messages to our time through the decades), I didn't see a single one which did not say: "For courage and heroism," "He acted with courage and boldness," "In accomplishing his task, he conducted himself with the highest level of courage." I take the liberty to hypothesize that the more staunch our courage and readiness to defend the fatherland will be, the less will be the probability that the potential aggressor will resort to nuclear adventurism.

Courage is needed not only on the battlefield. There are many situations in life when it is absolutely necessary to defend a correct viewpoint, oppose unfairness, or honestly acknowledge one's mistake. Unfortunately, not everyone is always able to look at unpleasant facts directly, courageously accept just criticism, and recognize the error of certain steps and actions. Sometimes it is true that this is also not enough. The fact is that in life there are no "rough drafts." Everything in a person's fate is written and done immediately in final form. The area of morality is a sphere where actions are often irreversible and it is better never to err.

A person without the pillars of courage is incapable of withstanding the blows of fate, overcoming "I can't" at a critical moment, and suppressing the momentary onset of spiritual weakness. I believe that it can even be said that the absence of the pillars for courage in a person is a sign of his moral mediocrity. Is he really capable of achieving the heights of self-sacrifice in the name of a noble cause? Who can say that a person lacking in courage will fulfill his duty to the end?

Speaking at the 19 April 1920 congress of textile industry workers, V. I. Lenin expressed the profound thought that it was exceptionally important for the Russian workers, struggling to accomplish great communist ideals, to form a "heroic consciousness." In our opinion, this expresses the constant readiness and capacity of the Soviet people to display the highest social activeness in the class struggle, in intense work, in scientific inquiry and in the defense of socialism.

Not all of us will have occasion in life to storm heights breathing of death, to save a field of grain from fire, or to disarm a criminal. But each of us in his life has had to, and will certainly have to make a moral choice, which will not always be simple and unambiguous. One who, for the sake of the public good, truth and justice will not fear to "spoil the relationship" with that which is unjust, and display civic selflessness, moral resolve, principles and courage, will scale, at the required moment, the highest peaks of a courageous feat. The main thing is to be prepared to do this.

Ever since the days of old, life has given generous opportunities to demonstrate this readiness. And it is displayed especially generously by young people. Out of 11,500 Soviet soldiers in the Great Patriotic War awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, approximately 8,000 were of Komsomol age.

The inculcation in Soviet youth of a "heroic consciousness," and readiness to accomplish feats of courage, is accomplished by our whole way of life and the entire existing system of forming an individual.

Some time ago young pathfinders found in the area of Vyazma a rifle cartridge case which contained a note written by Private Aleksandr Vinogradov, who, it was established, had died in that now distant battle. The lines on a scrap of paper, written in the deadly heat of battle, were filled with tremendous moral force: "Twelve of us were sent to the Minsk Highway to bar the way to tanks. And we held out steadfastly. Now only three of us are left: Kolya, Volodya and I, Aleksandr. The enemy are swarming. Yet one more has fallen -- Volodya the Latvian. But the tanks keep coming. There are two of us, but we will stand as long as we can breathe, but will not allow them to get through to the approaches to our troops. Now I am alone, wounded in my head and arm. Perhaps I will die. I am from Frunze, and am a Russian. I have no parents. Goodbye dear friends..."

One cannot read this human document without deep feelings. Strength of spirit and ideas were with the soldier as he stood to the death. Such people can be killed by a bullet or shell, but they cannot be defeated. It is just as impossible as it is to destroy a truly great idea by material force.

Back in the mid-19th Century, Karl Marx very profoundly and vividly talked about the rule of true ideas in the wealth of a person. He wrote that the ideas which govern our thinking and control our convictions, and to which our intellect compels our conscience, are bonds which cannot be broken without tearing out one's heart.

But they are bonds, not chains, and are a great organizing principle which enables one to attain unity of word and deed, thought and act.

If convictions are the intellectual and moral basis of the readiness to accomplish a heroic feat, then fulfilling one's duty is the best school for that readiness. Each of us, from his early childhood, barely understanding that he is a person, has heard: "You must do this;" "It is our duty;" "Be true to your duty." Our fathers and mothers told us these words about duty.

A human being is always duty-bound. He is duty-bound to the collective in which he stood on his feet, to the class which brought him up, and to the society which gave him the opportunities for all-round development. A person's fulfillment of his duty is an excellent school for inculcating all those qualities without which a heroic act is inconceivable.

People have always had the need to leave a chronicle of their time for their descendants. This need has given us the tremendous diary of the Leningrad schoolgirl, Tanya Savicheva, the notes of Musa Dzhalil', the front line notes

of K. Simonov, and the wise memoirs and reflections of the glorious military leaders Zhukov, Vasilevskiy and Rokossovskiy. This is the living fabric of history, its muffled echo, constantly sounding in combat, labor and revolutionary traditions. The ability to hear this echo aids us in maintaining the bowstring of our preparedness in the necessary condition. Appealing to the richness of our traditions reminds us that sometimes it is important not so much to reveal a new truth as to draw attention to an old one.

Moral maturity comes only when a person has the ability to be critical of himself, his thoughts and deeds. Some of us, it must be admitted, have traits, inclinations and streaks of character which are not pretty. These are the weeds of illusions and prejudices and the cinders of errors. The ability to evaluate them impartially, and at the same time the readiness to struggle against them, predetermines the moral maturity of a person, and his ability to develop a "heroic consciousness." And this is not always easy.

Moral readiness to accomplish a heroic feat, the highest manifestation of strength of spirit, is a pearl of great value. It is not subject to the erosion of time. It is formed by the society, collective and school. But can a person be made courageous if he does not himself constantly strive toward that end? Perhaps a person who does not set for himself the highest moral goal does not risk suffering moral defeat. But nor can he gain victory. There is no limit to moral growth. Our fathers and grandfathers understood this. And you and I also understand.

9069
CSO: 1801/327

ARMED FORCES

BELOBORODOV, YAZOV, BOBYLEV EXTOL SOVIET WWII VICTORY

Army General Beloborodov Interviewed

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 9 May 84 pp 1,3

[Interview with Army General A. Beloborodov, twice Hero of the Soviet Union:
"The Fatherland's Exploit"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Today the Soviet people, the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries, and all progressive mankind are celebrating the 39th anniversary of the victory over fascist Germany. This day is being marked in an atmosphere of the Soviet people's high labor and political activity. Workers of the cities and villages and the men of the Soviet Armed Forces are working persistently on realizing the decisions of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the instructions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, K. U. Chernenko. The economic and defensive might of our motherland is being strengthened, the material and cultural standard of living of the workers is rising, and the international authority of the Country of Soviets is growing.

In solving the biggest national economic and foreign policy problems today and thinking of tomorrow, the Soviet people are returning mentally to the events of the Great Patriotic War and are trying to evaluate even more completely and profoundly the majesty of the immortal exploit of our people who, in the spring of 1945, completed the destruction of a strong and crafty enemy--German fascism--and rid the world of fascist slavery. This exploit lives and will live forever in the hearts of our people and the peoples of the entire world.

On the request of the editors of SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN', one of the active participants in the Great Patriotic War, twice Hero of the Soviet Union and Army General Afanasiy Pavlant'yevich Beloborodov, tells about our great victory.

[Question] Comrade Army General, first of all, permit me to congratulate you, a prominent Soviet military leader, on the occasion of the victory, a special occasion for all of us.

[Answer] That is correct. The day of 9 May 1945 is inscribed as a new paragraph in the history of the Soviet state. With thousand-gun salvos of the ceremonial salute, on that day the capital of our motherland, Moscow, announced the victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War.

Our historic victory over fascism was won in a long and difficult struggle. Having enslaved many countries of Europe and using their economic and military potential, Hitlerite Germany encouraged by all the reactionary, imperialist forces and with their direct support moved against the Soviet country 190 divisions armed with the last word in military equipment and numbering 5.5 million soldiers and officers. The Hitlerite command left only 38 divisions in Western Europe. From the very start, the Soviet-German front became the principal, decisive front of World War II.

The true contribution of the heroic Soviet Army to the common victory over the enemy can be judged from the following figures. In the battles and engagements on the Soviet-German front the Wehrmacht lost more than 73 percent of the personnel, up to 75 percent of the tanks and assault guns, and more than 75 percent of the aviation. Setting down the main enemy forces, the Soviet Army completely and partially liberated 10 countries of Europe with a population of 113 million people.

The assertions of bourgeois ideologists alleging that the start of the war against the USSR was a triumphal procession for the German-fascist troops are absurd and far-fetched. What kind of procession can there be if during the first three weeks of combat operations alone the Hitlerites lost about 100,000 men killed and wounded and a large number of tanks, airplanes, and other weapons.

The underestimation of the forces and capabilities of the Soviet state and the morale-combat qualities of its fighting men and the groundless calculations and assumptions of the Hitlerite general staff were felt very quickly. Already by the middle of July 1941 the rates of advance of the fascist troops had been reduced several fold.

The wild idea of a "blitzkrieg" war was buried once and for all on the snow-covered fields near Moscow.

[Question] Did you have the occasion to participate in this historic battle?

[Answer] I commanded a division. As long as I live, I will remember my combat comrades who shielded the capital with their breasts. The destruction of the fascist armies at Moscow was an important turning point in the course of the entire World War II and had tremendous military-political significance. Peoples of all countries were convinced with their own eyes that there is in the world a force capable of crushing the German-fascist machine.

The skillful conduct of many brilliant offensive operations by the Soviet Army, beginning with the counteroffensive at Moscow and Stalingrad, also led in the end to the complete defeat of fascist Germany.

For the accomplishment of this main mission of the Great Patriotic War, the truly heroic efforts of all our people were required. The Soviet Army, partisans, and

workers of the rear area, united by the Communist Party into a single battle camp, gave all their strength to the destruction of the enemy. The advantages of the socialist economy permitted the USSR to achieve a decisive preponderance in the production of military equipment. Restructured in a short time on a military basis and completely subordinated to the interests of the front and the mission of the aggressor's most rapid destruction, during the war years the Soviet economy produced twice as much weapons and military equipment as fascist Germany.

[Question] This fact exactly refutes most convincingly of all, in particular, the fabrications being exaggerated in the West alleging that without the material assistance of the Allies the Soviet Army could not have restrained the onslaught of the German-fascist troops.

[Answer] The Soviet people, especially those who participated directly in the last war, know well the scales of Allied assistance. The United States and Great Britain delivered to us under lend-lease 9,600 guns, 11,576 tanks and self-propelled guns, and about 19,000 airplanes. Is this a little or a lot? Let us compare these figures with others which show that during the war years our industry gave the front 489,900 guns, 102,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts, and 136,800 airplanes. No, it was not the American and not the British owners of plants and concerns but the Soviet people--the soldiers and workers--who provided their army with everything necessary for victory.

Today, in reflecting on the results of the last war, people in the entire world understand that the aggressor could be crushed only thanks to the Soviet Union. It was the victory of a new social and state system born by the Great October, of the socialist economy and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and a victory of the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

The Leninist party raised and brought up fearless defenders of the fatherland. Both old and young fought the enemy. The men who took off for the front were replaced in production by women and teenagers. They produced weapons and raised grain. Millions of Soviet people waged a holy war with the enemy on territory which had been temporarily occupied. Their exploits, just as the exploits, courage, and heroism of all fighting men, soldiers, and officers are unforgettable. We lost 20 million of our comrades in the war. Their memory lives and will live forever in the hearts of the Soviet people.

[Question] The crushing defeat of fascist Germany and, several months later, of militaristic Japan radically changed the correlation of forces in the international arena in favor of peace, democracy, and socialism. However, with all this the lessons of the last war retain their significance even today.

[Answer] Of course, they are permanent, these lessons. And first of all, they imperiously remind us of the invariable aggressive essence of imperialism. The entire burden of responsibility for the unleashing of World War II lays precisely on the ruling circles of the leading imperialist powers. It is precisely they, the ruling circles of the United States, Great Britain, and other capitalist states who, in the 1930's, rendered fascist Germany abundant financial assistance and support in strengthening its military-industrial potential. Blinded by class hatred for socialism and disregarding the fates of peoples, at that time they

torpedoed all efforts by our party and the Soviet government to create a system of collective security in Europe and the world.

A similar story, unfortunately, is also observed today. Destroying the relaxation of international tension which had been achieved in the 1970's by the efforts of the USSR and the other socialist countries the leaders of the NATO bloc and, first of all, of the United States have set their course for the scrapping of the military-strategic balance which had been formed between the USSR and the United States and the member states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The strategists from Washington "issue" one after the other concepts and doctrines for a "disarming first nuclear strike" and "limited nuclear war", call for direct aggressive actions against the USSR, and are speeding up an unrestrained arms race.

Imperialism is trying to intensify the ominous clang of its military machine with militaristic rhetoric and ideological beating of the drum. "We will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history" and "We no longer adhere to a defensive position. It is precisely for this reason...that I called for a worldwide crusade...." It is not just someone who is expressing himself like this today, but the President of the United States, R. Reagan.

I, an old soldier, who marched along the frontline roads for many thousands of kilometers, want to say only one thing in this regard: you do not intimidate us, gentlemen! If you did not profit from the lessons of the last war, then we, the Soviet people, and all fighters for peace learned much from the war. It taught vigilance and the necessity constantly to be on the alert so that no aggressor can catch us unawares.

As the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, declared at the February (1984) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "We see well the threat which the reckless, adventuristic actions of imperialism's aggressive forces are creating for mankind today, and we speak of this in a full voice, calling the attention of the peoples of the entire world to this danger.

"We do not require military superiority, we do not intend to dictate our will to others. But we will not permit the breaking of the military balance which has been attained. And let not the slightest doubts remain with anyone: in the future, too, we will be concerned about strengthening the defensive capability of our country so that we will have sufficient means with the aid of which we can cool the hot heads of militant adventurers. This, comrades, is a very essential prerequisite for the preservation of peace."

The Soviet Union is countering imperialism's military adventures and its feverish arms race with the Leninist policy of the peace and security of peoples. Our peaceful foreign policy initiatives of recent years have received the broad support of progressive public opinion on all continents.

[Question] What can you say, comrade army general, about the men of our Armed Forces of this generation and heirs to the combat traditions of Great Patriotic War veterans?

[Answer] Today the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War are standing in the ranks of the Soviet motherland's defenders. They have not

passed the severe tests which befell the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army, our people, and the memory of those who fell in battles against fascism. Together with all Soviet people the Soviet servicemen are filled with resolve to protect, in the future too, everything which we have achieved in labor and in battle and which we obtained at such a dear price.

The steadfastness and courage of the Soviet people during the years of the Great Patriotic War and their glorious heroic deeds summon all servicemen and workers to new achievements in the name of the further strengthening of the fatherland's economic and defensive might and the happiness of man.

Army General Yazov

Dushanbe KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 9 May 84 pp 1-2

[Article by Army Gen D. Yazov, commander of Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "The Great Exploit of the Soviet People"]

The victory celebration.... The Soviet people and all progressive mankind are marking this exciting day for the 39th time. Eternal flames of memory burn today throughout the entire country. A proud, imperishable memory which binds together all generations of Soviet people. Its rises like an obelisk, burns with the eternal flames of glory, and looks from the yellowed photographs of family albums.

A severe and responsible fate befell my generation which entered the fiery forties at the time of maturity: to defend the fatherland in battles and forge the victory. Today, many years later, when you recall what befell the lot of the fighting men, commanders, and political officers of our army, at times it is not even believed that all this could be endured. And each one who fought and who forged the weapons of victory in the rear can say with pride: "We endured! We all endured, we passed through everything and endured, and we smashed the fascist aggressor."

At dawn on 22 June 1941, fascist Germany rained a strike of tremendous force on the Soviet Union without a declaration of war. The enemy's invasion army numbered 5.5 million men, 4,300 tanks, 47,200 guns and mortars, and 4,980 airplanes. The aggressor was superior to the Soviet troops three to four-fold on the directions of the main efforts.

At that hour of difficulty for the motherland the Communist Party, guided by the Lenin ideas of the defense of the socialist fatherland, stepped forth as the inspirer and organizer of the Soviet people's struggle against fascist Germany. Under exceptionally difficult conditions, exploiting the greatest advantages of socialism, and mobilizing the inexhaustible forces of our immense and mighty country, the party roused and organized the Soviet people for the Great Patriotic War.

At the basis of this great work were V. I. Lenin's instructions that under conditions of war the entire people should transfer all their efforts to the immediate tasks of the war. The party explained to the Soviet people the sacred

duty of each one to defend the motherland courageously and steadfastly and it called for selfless labor in the rear.

Many prominent figures, almost a third of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)], and 500 secretaries of Central Committees of Communist Parties of union republics, obkoms, kraykoms, gorkoms, and raykoms were sent to the front for political and military work. Altogether, during six months of the war 2,800 leading party workers poured into the Armed Forces. One million one hundred thousand communists and more than 2 million Komsomols reached the units of the active army, cementing their ranks. One hundred thousand political fighters alone were sent. At the end of 1941, despite losses there were 1,300,000 communists in the army and navy. At the most difficult critical moments of battles the call rang out: "Communists, forward!" And they were the first to rise up for the attack, carrying the fighting men along behind them and displaying models of courage and heroism, steadfastness and valor. During the war years, our party truly became a fighting party.

Thousands and thousands of fighters took off for the front from Tajikistan. In the units and large units which were formed in the republic, approximately every sixth commander and Red Army man was a communist. They cemented the ranks of the men and carried them along to exploits. Among those who were the first in repelling the onslaught of the fascist hordes were many men representing Tajikistan. Tajikistan fighting men displayed courage and steadfastness in the hot battles--full cavalier of the Order of Glory Alimurat Gaybov, Heroes of the Soviet Union Khaydar Kasymov, Bakir Davlyatov, Urumbek Yakibov, and many other loyal sons of the motherland.

The fascist aggressors encountered the stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops along the entire front. The decisive event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the historic Battle of Moscow. In the fall of 1941 the Hitlerite command concentrated more than 40 percent of its troops, three-fourths of the tanks, half the guns and mortars, and about one third of the airplanes here.

This was the first big defeat of the German-fascist troops in World War II. The theory and practice of the "blitzkrieg" suffered complete and final failure and the legend of the "invincibility" of the Hitlerite army was debunked. Germany found itself facing the fact of a protracted war on which it had not counted. The utter defeat of the Hitlerites at Moscow raised even higher the morale of the Soviet people and their servicemen and was the start of the basic turning point in the course of the war.

However, by that time fascist Germany and its satellites had not yet exhausted their offensive capabilities. Exploiting the absence of a second front in Europe, the Hitlerite command transferred 80 divisions from the west to the east during the summer and fall of 1942 and, in the summer of the war's second year, undertook a big offensive on the southern wing of the front.

The Battle of Stalingrad, the greatest battle in World War II which, for scale and significance, surpassed all battles and engagements of the past, began. In it, an enemy strategic force of 22 divisions was encircled and destroyed.

The victory on the Volga made a tremendous contribution to the attainment of a fundamental improvement in the Great Patriotic War and the entire World War II. The strategic initiative finally shifted to the hands of the Soviet troops which initiated a general offensive and continued it until the end of the war.

The victory of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Kursk Battle has tremendous, truly worldwide significance. It demonstrated convincingly to the entire world the ability of our country to smash German fascism and its allies with its own forces. Fascist Germany faced military catastrophe through the might of Soviet arms.

In 1944 and 1945 the Soviet Armed Forces executed an entire series of big strategic offensive operations at Leningrad and Novgorod, in the right-bank Ukraine, in the liberation of the Crimea and Odessa, on the Karelian Isthmus and Southern Karelia, in Belorussia and the Western Ukraine, in the Baltic and the Arctic, and in the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The liberation of the peoples of Europe who had been enslaved by fascism was begun in the summer of 1944. The offensive operations of the last year of the war played a decisive role in ridding the peoples of Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia of the fascist occupation and in the final victory over the fascist coalition. It was the greatest international exploit of the Soviet people and their army which cannot be cancelled by any falsifiers of history. At the same time, it was an unprecedented act of the humanism of the Soviet people and their army in the name of the freedom of many peoples.

The concluding event of the Great Patriotic War and World War II in Europe and the triumph of Soviet military art was the grandiose Berlin operation which began on 16 April. The garrison of the fascist capital capitulated on 2 May. The fall of Berlin marked the shameful end of the fascist regime and the complete failure of Hitler's Reich. Fascist Germany signed the act of unconditional surrender on 8 May.

On 9 May Soviet troops liberated the capital of Czechoslovakia--Prague. World War II in Europe ended with the brilliant victory of the Soviet people and their army and the victory of the antifascist forces. In celebration of this event, 9 May was declared the victory holiday and a day of national celebration.

In accomplishing its alliance obligations, on 8 August the USSR declared war against Japan. This was an act of historic justice. In 23 days, the Soviet Armed Forces utterly defeated the million-man Kwangtung Army--the most combat-effective and strongest force of the Japanese ground forces--and liberated Northeast China, North Korea, Southern Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands. On 2 September 1945 Japan signed the act of unconditional surrender. With the utter defeat of militaristic Japan the Great Patriotic War and, with it, World War II, were concluded.

The Soviet people carried the main burden of the war on their shoulders and played the decisive role in the utter defeat of fascist Germany and militaristic Japan. Many political, military, and public figures of Western states repeatedly recognized this truth in the period of the war. But after the war, especially on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the great victory, on order of reactionary imperialist circles and, first of all, of the United States bourgeois ideologists and military historians grossly falsify history.

Let us turn to facts which convincingly show the groundlessness of the fabrications of bourgeois falsifiers. If 607 enemy divisions were smashed and taken prisoner on the Soviet-German front, the American troops smashed and captured 176 divisions. In which regard, many of them were taken prisoner in the last days of the war, when its fate had already been predecided. In the course of the war with the Soviet Union fascist Germany lost three fourths of its aviation, more than half the tanks and artillery, and more than 2,500 combat ships and transport vessels. These facts alone show indisputably that it was precisely the Country of Soviets which became the main force which crushed the Hitlerite war machine.

The Soviet people were the main creators of our victory; they accomplished a patriotic and international exploit the equal of which history has never known. Never in the past did the heroism of the fatherland's defenders assume such a mass character. For exploits at the fronts more than seven million men were awarded orders and medals. More than 11,000 best of the best servicemen were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them are representatives of 100 nations and nationalities of our motherland. More than 800 glorious sons and daughters of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were awarded titles of Hero of the Soviet Union. Among them are 63 Tajikistan soldiers.

The Communist Party conducted truly titanic work in reorganizing the national economy on a war basis in strict accordance with the Lenin behest that for the conduct of a war in a genuine manner a strong organized rear area is necessary. The great exploit of 16 million workers, kolkhoz farmers, and representatives of the intelligentsia was marked by the medal "For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." Approximately 200 of them were awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. The victory salute of 9 May 1945 also thundered in honor of those who forged the weapons of victory, raised the grain, and served as models of a labor exploit in the rear area.

A tremendous role in the attainment of victory was played by the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the moral-political unity of Soviet society, and the fraternal friendship and solidarity of the peoples of the USSR. In preparing war against the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites relied on being able to drive a wedge between the Soviet peoples. However, the enemy miscalculated. All the peoples of our country rose up for the defense of the motherland on the party's call.

The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War has world and historic significance. It exerted and is exerting the deepest influence on the entire further course of world development. The victory over fascism became an historic boundary in the fates of all mankind. Its most profound consequences--today's successes of world socialism, the steady growth in revolutionary forces, and our great achievements in the struggle for a firm peace on Earth.

The Great Patriotic War taught the Soviet people much. And first of all--vigilance and the necessity always to be on the alert. The entire accumulated experience, the international situation which has developed, and especially facts of recent times require us to keep our powder dry. The CPSU and the Soviet government are doing everything necessary so that the country's defensive capability is maintained at the proper level. The party displays constant concern that the organization and technical equipping of the troops and the level of

training, instruction, and political indoctrination of the personnel correspond to contemporary requirements.

Formidable contemporary equipment has also been entrusted to the men of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District who are serving on the territory of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan, on land which raised up thousands and thousands of valiant heroes. The men of the 1980's are standing vigilant guard over the beloved fatherland and are continuing combat traditions in a worthy manner. Loyal sons of their heroic people and heirs and continuers of their revolutionary and combat traditions, the men of the district's units and subunits are accomplishing with honor their patriotic duty in the defense of the socialist fatherland. They display their striving to maintain their alignment on the exploits of the heroes of battles first of all in selfless soldierly labor.

Victory day is a holiday which is especially dear to each Soviet person. In marking it for the 39th time, our people appear before the entire world as a united ideological-political unity, a mighty, indefatigable, and proud people, a heroical people, a worker people, and a patriot people. Displaying high political and labor activity the Soviet people, including the men of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, inspired by the decisions of the April (1984) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the speech of Comrade K. U. Chernenko, at it, and the materials of the first session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th convocation, are giving all their strength to the further raising of the economic and defensive might of the beloved motherland.

Colonel General S. Bobylev

Moscow SOVETSKAYA KUL'TURA in Russian 9 May 84 p 1

[Article by Col Gen S. Bobylev, member of Military Council, chief of Political Directorate, Air Defense Forces: "A Great Exploit"]

[Text] The routine days of the Soviet people are filled with inspired creative labor these May days when our entire country and all progressive mankind are marking the 39th anniversary of the victory over fascism. This day went down in the history of the 20th century as an unfading page: it went down not only in reader books, in textbooks, literature and music, and in art, but also in the living consciousness of the world's residents.

The victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over fascist Germany, and later over militaristic Japan, exerted a profound influence on the entire course of mankind's history. And if today the peoples of the world enjoy the blessings of peace, then for this they are indebted to a great extent to the unparalleled exploit accomplished by the Soviet people during the terrible war years.

For four war years simple people of the Earth looked with hope on the Country of Soviets as a force capable of saving the world from fascist enslavement and of blocking the path for the epidemic of the brown plague in all regions of the planet.

The socialist state justified these hopes and aspirations of progressive mankind. In mortal combat with the strong and cunning enemy the Soviet people were able not only to defend their socialist achievements, but also to make the decisive contribution to the liberation of the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement and they accomplished their international duty with honor.

Returning in memory through the curtain of time to the events of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War which were filled with drama and a witness to and participant in which I had the occasion to be, you are imbued with a special sense of pride for our glorious Communist Party, the leadership of which was the main source of the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces.

The entire multinational Soviet people rose up for the defense of the fatherland on the call of the Communist Party. In a short time, the country was transformed into a single military camp and its entire life was subordinated to the slogan, "Everything for the front, everything for victory!" The party assumed full responsibility for the fate of the socialist motherland. It became a "fighting party," and its Central Committee--a combat staff which headed and directed the struggle of the party and people in the Great Patriotic War.

The party did everything possible to utilize most completely and correctly the great advantages of the socialist system and strengthen the Armed Forces and it conducted important work in instilling in the Soviet people firm conviction in the righteousness of our cause and in victory over the enemy. In difficult defensive battles the Soviet Army bled the enemy, brought about a fundamental improvement in the course of the war and, launching a decisive offensive, won the greatest victory.

The final outcome of the giant engagement with fascism was caused not by any chance, as bourgeois falsifiers of the history of World War II assert, but by a whole number of regular laws which are inherent in socialism. The most important of them--the advantages of the economic, political, and military organization of the new social system and its leading Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Our industry accomplished its main task with success. During the war years, it produced almost twice as much combat equipment and, as a whole, of higher quality, than German industry. The agricultural workers made a huge contribution to the cause of smashing the enemy. During the difficult war years the kolkhoz peasantry appeared before the entire world as a class which history had not known--strong, inseparably linked with the entire country, and imbued with an ardent patriotic feeling.

Great credit in the attainment of the victory belongs to our people's intelligentsia. Soviet scientists and designers created many models of contemporary weapons and combat equipment. Figures of socialist culture who devoted their creativity to the attainment of victory over fascism earned national gratitude during the war years.

Writers, poets, composers, artists, and actors marched in step together with workers, kolkhoz farmers, scientists, and specialists of the national economy and together with the Soviet servicemen. With their ideological weapons--prose, poems, music, and means of fine and theatrical arts--they instilled in the Soviet

people hatred for the enemy, vividly disclosed the nature of the Soviet man, and showed the sources of his gigantic strength.

Many actors and entire theatrical collectives conducted important military-sponsorship work. Concert and theatrical brigades travelled out to the troop units and ships. These were unusual tours. Concerts were often conducted not far from the front line, and the stage was replaced by the bodies of vehicles, tank turrets, and forest glades. Artists beloved by the people constantly appeared before the soldiers and officers: K. Baysentova, V. Barsova, Ye. Gogoleva, I. Kozlovskiy, S. Lemeshev, M. Mikhaylov, I. Moskvin, I. Patorzhinskiy, L. Ruslanova, A. Tarasova, M. Tarkhanov, K. Shul'zhenko, and many others.

On various fronts I had the occasion to hear fighting, inspiring presentations by actors of the Moscow stage, the Central Theater of the Soviet Army, and other creative collectives. I recall that on the Second Ukrainian Front the Moldavian "Doyna" ensemble appeared before participants of a conference of Komsomol workers prior to preparations for the Yassko-Kishinev operation. With what pride and lively attention did the leaders of the Komsomol collectives listen to Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian folk songs and wartime songs! And each of us returned from the concert to the combat formations with a tremendous charge of patriotism, pride for our people, and hatred for the enemy.

The songs "I Returned to my Friends" by V. Solov'yev-Sedoy, "A Very Cold Wind" by A. Novikov, "The Dugout" by K. Listov, and many others which were widespread in 1942 are remembered even today.

The high ideological conviction of the Soviet people and their patriotism and internationalism which were instilled by the party found their most vivid expression in heroism. It was heroism of a new type which was distinguished by an exceptional mass nature. History knew no examples of selflessness, steadfastness, and organization as those displayed by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

One can name thousands of glorious Soviet servicemen who accomplished remarkable exploits in the name of the motherland and in the name of victory over the enemy. More than 300 of them repeated the exploit of Aleksandr Matrosov, closing the firing ports of enemy earth-and-timber emplacements with their breasts. The exploit of Nikolay Gastello who directed his burning airplane at an accumulation of enemy personnel and equipment was repeated about 350 times. More than 11,000 men became Heroes of the Soviet Union. During the war there were 5,300,000 awards of orders and 7,580,000 awards of medals of the USSR.

The Soviet people and their heroic Armed Forces carried the main burden of the struggle with the Hitlerite war machine on their shoulders and played the main role in the smashing of fascist Germany and its allies. At the same time, we never forget that the final victory over fascism was attained by the joint efforts of states of the anti-Hitler coalition and of all freedom-loving peoples.

Unfortunately, today in many sources in the West a striving to belittle the role of the USSR in the utter defeat of fascism and militarism and to distort the question of the reasons and culprits of the war is noted. It is completely obvious that the lie and distortion and juggling with facts by reactionary bourgeois historians and several leaders of Western states are being accomplished

with a specific goal and are dictated by the striving to substantiate ideologically the initiation of a new edition of a "crusade" to destroy socialism as a social system.

Under the false fiction of a Soviet military threat, the militant circles of the United States and NATO are trying to change the approximately equal correlation of military-strategic forces in their favor and attain military superiority over the socialist world. In implementing a supermilitaristic program, Washington is developing new types of weapons for the mass destruction of people, conducting preparations for the use of outer space for military purposes, and expanding the scales of psychological warfare against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth.

Of course, the Soviet Union cannot fail to consider the danger of military preparations in the imperialist camp and the strained situation in the world created through its fault. The Soviet people have no greater desire than to preserve peace which has been won at a dear price.

The Soviet Union is countering the madness of a nuclear arms race with a clear, specific, and optimistic program directed toward protecting the peace, creating an atmosphere of confidence between states, and halting the alarming development of events.

People of good will everywhere are perceiving the proposal concerning the adoption, by the nuclear powers, of specific standards of relations which are rightly called the code for peace put forth by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, as an inspiring step in this direction. The new large scale and broad initiative of the CPSU and the Soviet state meets the vital interests of all peoples and states and coincides with the notion of all states concerning peace and international security.

Thanks to the constant concern of the party and the government and of all the people, the Soviet Armed Forces have everything necessary for the accomplishment of their assigned missions. Formidable weapons and combat equipment are in the reliable and skillful hands of a new generation of Soviet servicemen. They inherited not only the combat glory of their fathers and grandfathers, but also tremendous responsibility for the fate of the motherland and peace on Earth. Patriots and internationalists are vigilantly protecting the revolutionary achievements and standing shoulder to shoulder in a single combat formation with the men of the fraternal socialist countries.

As Comrade K. U. Chernenko stressed in his speech to the workers of the "Sickle and Hammer" plant: "June 1941 will not be repeated. Immediate retribution will overtake any aggressor. Let everyone know this--both our friends and our enemies."

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces are marking the victory celebration under the sign of the struggle for peace and with a sense of profound gratitude and respect for those who, regardless of their own lives, fought and defended the honor, freedom, and independence of our motherland.

Victory Day is not only the memory of the past. It is also a stern warning to those who would like to plunge mankind into the abyss of a nuclear war.

ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA IDENTIFIES OFFICER

PM301021 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 July 1984 Second Edition carries on page 2 a 200-word "own correspondent" report from the Transbaykal military district on a meeting of the district's Komsomol Aktiv, reportedly attended by "Lieutenant General P. Ledyayev, first deputy commander of the district."

CSO: 1801/379

GROUND FORCES

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS TRAINING PROCEDURES REVIEWED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 3

[Article by Col V. Dotsenko: "Advice of a Methods Specialist: Against Targets from a Halt"]

[Text] Let's examine in detail, to the extent possible, the procedure for holding a practical class on the subject "Firing Rules." The following lessons are studied in the class: selection of the backsight and point of aim when firing the submachinegun from a halt against bobbing and moving targets; determination and consideration of corrections for ballistic and meteorological conditions.

The training can be conducted in parallel with a practice of firing techniques against the background of a specific tactical situation, or without such practice. In any case it is important to observe the prescribed sequence in studying the firing rules. Before receiving practice in accomplishing fire missions a person must firmly understand the recommendations developed for designating initial settings--elevation, backsight and point of aim depending on distance to target, nature of the target and firing conditions--in which the mean trajectory would pass through the middle of the target. Basic provisions of internal and external ballistics should be gone over in advance during independent preparation.

The practice must be arranged so that all personnel simultaneously hone their skills in applying the firing rules. Maximum use must be made of all available shooting simulators, aiming rests and other training devices intended for teaching small arms fire. In addition, the class requires a commander's box, instructions (a manual) on shooting, and firing tables, particularly tables of the height of trajectories above the line of sight and tables of corrections for meteorological conditions.

Initially rules are presented for selecting the range setting and point of aim with consideration only for the distance to the target and the target's size. A demonstration is given of how to use the table of the height of trajectories above the line of sight.

After displaying one of the targets set up at various lines and distances, the instructor announces the distance to it and orders the submachinegunners to use the tables to determine the range setting and point of aim. Then he checks the range setting and laying of the weapon and demands that the decision be substantiated. The task can be made more complicated after several such exercises by having the trainees themselves measure the distance to an indicated target (a new one), determine initial settings and lay the weapon on the target. If it turns out that a trainee has made a mistake in accomplishing the task the commander gives a narrative problem: over, under, right, left. A person acting in response to the narrative must make the appropriate correction and repeat the "fire."

After performing such tasks the commander uses the discussion method to restore the knowledge in trainees' minds about how the wind (crosswind and range wind) and air temperature affect a bullet's flight. Appropriate instructions provide correction values for average firing conditions. It is impossible to memorize the values of all tabular corrections, and there is no need for this. Under actual conditions on the battlefield the wind velocity and direction as well as the target's speed are determined approximately by eye. For example, it is convenient to determine and take account of corrections for a crosswind for small arms in target figures. The calculation usually is done in values of the most typical target--human figures (with a width of 0.5 m). The result is easy to recalculate into other target figures.

Training in the technique of shifting the point of aim with consideration of a crosswind can be done using posters and the special Vertushka device. Use of the orthoscope with a dioptric or side mirror and especially a shooting rule with a demonstration foresight, which are included in the set of the commander's box, also justifies itself. The shooting rule permits a graphic demonstration of mistakes in aiming, in shifting the point of aim for wind and target movement, and in adjusting fire. Recommendations on using the shooting rule as well as the other training equipment are set forth in an appropriate aid. I only wish to note that trainees must be given sufficient time for independent practice in shifting the point of aim by a varying number of figures with subsequent monitoring of their actions using the rule. The benefit from the practice will be even greater if it is held subsequently together with the accomplishment of fire missions.

To do this the instructor announces the firing conditions (for example, a strong wind from the right), displays the target on the terrain and requires trainees to determine the range to the target, its direction and speed and the amount of line correction, and to take aim. In his report each subordinate substantiates the amount of aim-off. For example, a hand-held antitank rocket launcher was displayed at a distance of 400 m. In aiming the trainee took account of the width of an RPG [antitank rocket launcher], which equals 1 m. His point of aim in line had an aim-off to the right by two figures, and in height it was the middle of the target.

An instructor must accustom subordinates to substantiate their actions even when accomplishing missions of firing against targets moving with varying

speed, in all possible directions and at various distances. Posters and various mock-ups can be of substantial help here. For example, a mock-up of bullet trajectories will help explain that bullet trajectories will occupy various positions with respect to the point of aim when aiming at the middle of the base of a running figure. When firing the submachinegun with range setting 5 at a distance of 500 m the height of trajectory above the line of sight will equal zero, i.e., if one aims at the middle of the target's base, the hit probability will be low. But if the target is approaching and is at a range of 400 m, then the height will be 95 cm. In aiming beneath the target the firer can count on hitting the chest, the broadest part of the target, because the hit probability will be greatest. Based on this, the commander and all trainees after him draw the conclusion that in order to improve firing accuracy it is necessary to change the point of aim in height without changing the range setting corresponding to the point-blank range to the target. For example, to hit a running figure with range setting 5 at a distance of 500 m one must aim at the middle of the target, lower the point of aim as it approaches and aim beneath the target at a range of 400 m. The point of aim is changed accordingly when the target is moving away from the firer.

After trainees obtain sufficient practice in performing individual elements of the techniques and rules of firing from the halt against bobbing and moving targets it is possible to begin practice on accomplishing various missions as a whole and performance of firing exercises. The conditions for accomplishing these missions become more complicated, time for firing is reduced, distances to targets and target speeds increase from class to class and the trainees' skills are taken to an automatic state in actions with the weapon and in applying the firing rules.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

GROUND FORCES

ROLE OF ARTILLERY REPAIR BRIGADES EXAMINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 10

[Article by Sr WO [Praporshchik] R. Mustafin, weapons platoon commander, 1st class specialist, Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "It is Our Duty to be Masters: Useful Lessons"]

[Text] Remedy malfunctions quickly and replace basic assemblies, components and mechanisms of the authorized weapon quickly are the requirements placed on specialists preparing for tests for the title of "master." In this article Sr WO R. Mustafin tells how artillerymen are improving the skills of repairmen.

Our warrant officers who command artillery platoons regularly improve their level of professional knowledge and their class rating. Some of them have come right up to the point of achieving the level of master in the very near future. It seems they have a good understanding of the seriousness of the task facing them, but now and then one hears the remark: our chief job is to control subunit fire skillfully, and let the special subunit handle repairs should they be necessary. That's what it is for.

I will say frankly that at one time I myself held the very same opinion. The fact is that modern artillery systems are reliable and malfunctions of mechanisms and assemblies are rare. And so the thought arose: is it worthwhile to master a repairman's special skills? But that was the case until a certain incident.

I remember we rode out to the range. Prior to that we had checked the equipment as prescribed and everything seemed to be normal. But on the following day one of the guns in my platoon suddenly fell silent at the beginning of firing. No matter how I and my subordinates tried to learn the reason for the trouble, we couldn't. We had to turn to Sr Lt V. Kolomytsev for help. The experienced specialist made a "diagnosis" without particular difficulty: a spring had broken because of improper assembly of the semiautomatic breech mechanism. The officer made the gun combat-ready in just a few minutes and I was ashamed to look my subordinates in the eye. In essence it was a trifling malfunction, but time was lost because of it and we received a poor grade for fulfillment of the operational training mission.

This lesson was not lost upon me. Since then it has not been necessary to persuade me that a gunner also needs the ability to repair weapons. Subsequently I did not waste time. In the evenings I would delve into theoretical provisions and in the motor pool I would try to apply them in practice. I delved with particular care into the design of the breech mechanism, recoil systems and laying mechanisms.

I sought every opportunity to augment my knowledge. For example, when some breakdown would occur in a piece and it was necessary to summon the repairmen, I didn't sit to one side, but rolled up my sleeves and worked together with them. I took apart many mechanisms with my own hands down to the last screw, as the saying goes.

Technical conferences also helped in many matters. Previously I had not taken an active part in them, but now I give some kind of brief announcement at almost every one, most often about methods of repairing weapons. Officer A. Sudnik took note of my interest and suggests topics. It is a very useful albeit troublesome matter. You study more than one pamphlet while preparing.

The incident at the range served as grounds for a serious conversation in all the unit's subunits. Experience showed that proper conclusions were drawn. Now considerably more attention is given to the platoon commanders' technical preparation. New forms have appeared for improving their knowledge.

For example, in planning servicing days and weapons maintenance a portion of the time has begun to be set aside for microproblems. These usually are conducted by battery commanders, with several minutes before the beginning of a job devoted to the theory of the matter. Let's say that one or two platoon commanders are told to give a brief reminder of the procedure for checking the quantity and quality of fluid in recoil systems and hydraulic drives, pressure in the recuperator and so on before the recoil systems are serviced. The officers give explanations if necessary.

During field exercises the time for such questions naturally can't always be found, but if the slightest opportunity should appear it is used without fail. The benefit here is not only in the fact that we are strengthening knowledge: the commander has an opportunity to find the weak places in subordinates' training, make corrections to assignment plans for independent preparation, and choose the most current topic for the next technical conference or quiz.

Experience shows that there is no need to resort to the help of repair subunit specialists to remedy many malfunctions. These considerations prompted the thought of setting up non-T/O&E repair brigades in the artillery battalions.

I direct one such brigade. It is small: just five persons. These are the most competent artillerymen in the technical sense. Once a week I hold a class with them for studying the equipment and repair technology. Privates and NCO's learn to perform the operations of replacing parts quickly and faultlessly.

What did this give us? Now each battalion has specialists capable of remedying serious trouble on their own. The qualification of brigade leaders also naturally grows.

I also would like to emphasize that the higher level of platoon commanders' preparedness had a positive effect on a growth in their subordinates' proficiency. Gun crew members not only broaden their knowledge and hone practical skills, but also perform certain repair operations skillfully.

In one exercise, for example, the power rammer malfunctioned on Sgt V. Sokolov's piece. It had to be urgently disassembled and the bolt replaced. This is laborious work which requires precision and attentiveness, but the soldiers coped with it successfully and quickly.

We succeeded in attaining high results in combat training in the last training period. The unit moved into the ranks of foremost based on socialist competition results. Of course we are very proud of this, but we still don't forget that the demand also is stricter on the leaders. This is why almost every warrant officer planned higher goals of professional growth. I decided to achieve the level of master. Other warrant officers also are approaching this goal, for it is the duty of each one of us to become a master of our job.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

NAVAL FORCES

ARTICLE ACCUSES U.S. OF USING NAVY FOR 'AGGRESSIVE PURPOSES'

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Jun 84 p 3

[Article by G. Suvorov: "Why is it Not Peaceful on the Oceans?"]

[Text] Mankind is greatly indebted to the world's oceans. Life on our planet originated in their waters. They have served as the storehouse of food resources. The first routes connecting various countries and peoples traversed the oceans. Presently, as mineral resources reserves on land are gradually being exhausted, the importance of their extraction from ocean seabeds is increasing. How paradoxical it is that, although their utilization began in times immemorial, we still do not know very much about the oceans, and are only on the threshold of assimilating their riches. The development of our civilization will be determined to an ever greater extent by our successes in the economic use of ocean resources.

These successes must be assured by maintaining peace on earth and strengthening mutually advantageous international relations. As Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko emphasized, only peaceful cooperation on land, in space or in utilizing the world's oceans permits the full revelation of mankind's inexhaustible capabilities.

Unfortunately, elements of military confrontation on the oceans thus far predominate over elements of cooperation. This is not the fault of the Soviet Union. It is not our country which is the initiator of the naval arms race. It is not the USSR which claims to be establishing supremacy on the sea, and it is not in the Soviet Union that the imperialist doctrine of "sea-power," formulated at the end of the 19th Century by American Admiral Mahan, is being implemented. We are undertaking only lawful defensive measures to defend our sea borders.

It is primarily the United States and its allies in various blocs which are inflaming the situation on the oceans. Five out of every six states on earth have access to the sea, and U. S. naval power threatens almost all of them. The extent of this threat is eloquently seen in the frequency in which the American Navy is used for aggressive purposes. Since the end of the Second World War, Washington has engaged its navy in more than 200 interventionist actions. This is a rather dismal statistic if one keeps in mind that behind it also stands the death of innocent people, the destruction of peaceful villages and the burdens of foreign occupation.

The 1980's have been marked by particular intensification of the activity of the U. S. Navy on the oceans, and it is far from accidental that this has coincided with the coming to power of the Reagan Administration. I think it would be difficult to name any other administration of the entire post-war period which placed such strong reliance on the Navy in its military-political strategy. From the very beginning it has undertaken to achieve naval superiority. "We need naval superiority," warns Reagan. "We are after nothing less," Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Secretary of the Navy Lehman echo the President.

The Reagan Administration's adoption of a new naval strategy has given strong impetus to the creation of a system of strategic sea-based weapons. The construction of an entire fleet of 20 Ohio Class ballistic missile submarines is being carried out at an accelerated pace. Strategic cruise missile systems are beginning to be installed on surface and sub-surface vessels.

Substantial expansion of general purpose naval forces is also planned. The creation of a 600 ship Navy -- one of the commitments closest to the heart of the administration -- will already be concluded in the years just ahead. Do not think that the U. S. intends to stop with this. The Navy command is openly beginning to say that the 15 planned carrier battle groups will be "inadequate." As is well known, the appetite grows as one eats.

U. S. armadas do not stand idle as the discussions of "naval inadequacy" go on. Periodically they surround Central America from two sides -- the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. Last year, namely with the help of the Navy and Marine Corps, the U. S. undertook an attack of Grenada. The threat of naval intervention has already been hanging over Nicaragua for a number of years.

Nor does the Middle East escape Washington's attention. American admirals are well acquainted with the route to the waters of the Mediterranean and Arabian seas. Quite recently a mighty naval grouping was concentrated near Lebanon. It included the many-gunned Battleship New Jersey, recently removed from the reserve, whose guns rained deadly showers -- rounds weighing several hundreds of kilograms -- on the populated areas of Lebanon. Since the end of the 1970's the Persian Gulf has become a magnet attracting U. S. Navy carrier battle groups.

The situation in the Indian Ocean is probably the most visible example of the fact that American naval forces do not act alone. France and Great Britain also maintain here an imposing naval presence. The navies of European NATO countries give tangible support to the American admirals in many areas of the world's oceans, but primarily in those which are adjacent to USSR territory.

In the Far East, the process of drawing Japan and its naval "self defense forces" into the orbit of U. S. naval strategy has been stepped up. The U. S. is pushing Tokyo to repudiate a number of healthy principles which have guided Japanese policy during the post-war years. As a result, it desires to give missions to the Japanese Navy which undermine these principles and simply contradict the constitution of that country and international law.

At the same time, the capitals of U. S. allies also give independent missions to their navies. In 1982 British ships were sent to the South Atlantic to seize the Falkland Islands. The victory gained by the Royal Navy in this imperialistic war can hardly be termed brilliant. It became a tragedy for many ordinary British people who lost husbands, fathers and sons there.

The Falklands adventure, and also the failure of the U. S. Navy mission in the Lebanon conflict, refuted the widespread Western opinion that the use of naval forces carries minimal costs. Such opinions are far from realistic. The idea, which has regained currency, about the "limited" nature of naval conflict, also does not correspond to reality. Any naval crisis can grow easily into a land crisis. Moreover, any conflicts, be they on land or sea, hold the threat of exploding the nuclear powder kegs.

The ease with which Washington turns to naval forces places on the agenda the need to struggle to limit naval operations and armaments. The Soviet Union -- equally a great naval and continental power -- has long been striving to move the resolution of this problem off of dead center. Over the course of several decades it has advanced various initiatives intended to facilitate the demilitarization of the oceans.

Presently our country is proposing an entire program of appropriate measures. Prominent in this program is the limitation of the strategic arms race on the sea expanses. An important component of the program is the creation of zones of peace in, for example, the Mediterranean Sea, Indian ocean and Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union is proposing placing limits on long duration naval presence far from one's own shores. Also being raised is the subject of limiting and directly reducing naval armaments, especially those such as aircraft carriers, and that of the importance of limiting anti-submarine warfare activity.

The program advanced by the Soviet Union for limiting the level of military confrontation on the oceans is truly comprehensive in nature. It is permeated throughout with recognition of the fact that the process of militarization of the oceans openly impedes the expansion of their peaceful use for the benefit of all mankind, and urges on the growth of international tension.

9069
CSO: 1801/327

NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL SCHOOL IN TASHKENT OPERATES WITH ARTIFICIAL 'SEA'

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 5 February 1984 carries on page 4 an 800 word article by A. Veklich (student) titled "Tashkent Naval School." The article concerns the DOSAAF Tashkent Naval School. The author notes that most people when they hear of such a place are amused or cannot believe it. Nevertheless, there is such a place, and things are run there just as on a real ship. Even the daily schedule resembles that observed on a ship. After finishing the school it is easier to overcome the difficulties of being on a ship. Former pupils of the school who have served at sea for short periods and are studying at naval academies come frequently to visit the school and talk with the children there. Recently former pupil Bahrom Hasanov came; the children learned a lot from him about naval service, long cruises and the career of naval officer. Hasanov is a second class petty officer who has recently become a member of the CPSU. At present the Tashkent DOSAAF Naval School is carrying out a month campaign of mass activity. The students make frequent visits to the Museum of the History of the Turkestan Military District Forces, see films about exercises of the Soviet Navy, and go to the Tashkent Branch of the Lenin Museum. Among former students of the school are Igor' Bolkin, Salovat Yulayev, Tohir Imonov and Ramil' Fakhriyev who are now serving on the cruiser Minsk.

CSO: 1836/49

DOSAAF

DOSAAF SPONSORS RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING COMPETITION

Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 20 Apr 84 p 4

[Article by V. Shabalin: "Foxhunt"]

[Text] The 27th TuSSR championship in sports radio direction-finding, "Fox-hunt," has concluded in Chardzhou. Combined teams from all the oblast and republic sports-technical clubs of the defense society contended for the cup of the Turkmenistan DOSAAF Central Committee.

The "foxes" -- automatic radio transmitters -- were skillfully camouflaged over a difficult nine kilometer course, among shifting sand dunes and elm thickets. The sportsmen were required to take a direction-finding bearing and find them in the minimum possible time. In addition to searching for the "foxes" within the 145 and 3.5 megahertz wave bands, grenade throwing was included in the multi-event competitive program.

Among the men, V. Kolpakov, a candidate master sportsman from Ashkhabad, won the title of TSSR champion. S. Chebotarev, a first-rank competitor from Chardzhou became the silver medalist, defeating by several seconds last year's champion, Ashkhabad candidate master sportsman I. Osetinskiy.

A stubborn battle for the title of champion was waged among the women. N. Pertsova, candidate master sportswoman and nursery school teacher from Chardzhou, collected winning points from start position to start position. As a result she won first place. On the second rung of the pedestal of honor was A. Karina, candidate master sportswoman and Turkmen Polytechnical Institute student. A. Tarasenko, Ashkhabad candidate master sportswoman, was third.

Among the youth, first-rank competitor A. Shevchuk, a student at City Vocational-Technical School No 5, was the undisputed leader. S. Gubenko from Ashkhabad was second place winner in the championship, and Ye. Gornostayev from Krasnovodsk was third.

Chardzhou schoolgirl M. Shcherbina was the winner in the girls' sub-category. M. Volovich, first-rank competitor from Ashkhabad, was second. The bronze medal winner was M. Pukhteyeva, a student at Tashauz School No 3.

The "hunters" from the DOSAAF Republic Sports-Technical Club came in first in overall team competition. The teams from Chardzhou and Ashkhabad oblasts were second and third respectively.

Based on the results of the spring "Foxhunt," a combined Turkmenistan team was formed, which will defend the honor of the republic at the all-union championship in sports radio direction-finding.

RIFLERY AT TASHKENT SPORTS CLUB

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 5 February 1984 carries on page 3 an 800 word article by E. Maksumov (non-staff correspondent of YOSH LENINCHI) titled "Mastery and Character." The article reports on the riflery activities at the Tashkent DOSAAF Sports Club. Last year alone this club produced 19 sportsmen with class ratings in revolver shooting and 34 with class ratings in rifle shooting. There are improvements being carried out at the club in accordance with the joint resolution concerning matters of improving riflery sport adopted by the Committee on Physical Culture and Sport under the USSR Council of Ministers and the DOSAAF Central Committee. Young people 14 years old and older are admitted into the club. The instructor of the club is I. A. Aronov. Up to the present there have been over 5,000 young people who have participated in the various types of riflery activities. Among them are first class athletes Andrey Kazakov, Sasha Zolotnov, Oleg Sisoyev, Rizida Habibullina, Lena Sherkhojayeva and Dima Popov. Every year the club holds a mass month campaign. A lot has been done in recent times to improve the sports facilities: new indoor and outdoor shooting galleries have been set up and new equipment has been purchased. For two years now the youth group at the DOSAAF city Riflery Sport Club has won second place in city competitions. But the most important thing is said to be the mass character of the sport.

CSO: 1836/49

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

RUSSIAN KEY TO SUCCESS AT ALMA-ATA MILITARY ACADEMY

[Editorial Report] Tashkent YOSH LENINCHI in Uzbek 5 February 1984 carries on page 2 an 800 word article by I. Hikmatov titled "On the Way to Their Dreams." The article concerns two young men from Tajikistan, Bakhtiyor Sodiqov and Bakhtiyor Akromov, who are studying at the Alma-Ata General Forces Commander Academy. Hikmatov reports that when Sodiqov first thought about a career as a military officer, his mother was not very enthusiastic. She left the matter up to him, but she warned him that if he failed to be admitted to the academy he would be ashamed to face his relatives. However, Sodiqov was admitted to the academy and has been successful in meeting the challenges of its rigorous routine. One of the things which has helped Sodiqov has been his mastery of Russian and his desire to know the language even better. Sodiqov remembers the day when new graduates of a military academy came to visit the upper class pupils at the school he attended, Dushanbe's School No. 53. Even before this visit, thanks to Sodiqov's school's military education instructor Yu. G. Tarbushkin, Sodiqov already knew about the conditions to enter military academies. The article describes the subjects studied at the military academy and the facilities (sports, library) at the school. Most of the cadets are very fit athletes. They often enjoy amateur artistic activities. At one concert Akromov performed some Tajik folk dances which were very warmly received. Both Sodiqov and Akromov have been accepted to CPSU candidate membership.

CSO: 1836/49

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

POSSIBLE USE OF TANKS AGAINST HELICOPTERS EXAMINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 84 (signed to press 22 May 84) p 30

[Article by Engr-Col Ye. Viktorov based on foreign press materials: "In NATO Armies: Tanks Against Helicopters"]

[Text] Foreign military reviewers often mention that helicopters with both missiles and cannon as weapons have become a serious threat for tanks. The rotary-wing craft can appear suddenly in the vicinity of a tank concentration and bring them under fire from an elevation, sending missiles and rounds into the most vulnerable sections of the hull and turret in comparison with the frontal armor. NATO specialists note that even the best foreign tanks (for example, such as the American M-1 Abrams, the West German Leopard-2, the British Challenger and others) are insufficiently protected against helicopters. At the same time it is believed to be practically impossible to continue increasing armor on the hull roof plate and within the hull of these vehicles to the requisite level without detriment to their combat features. Therefore additional weaponry has been placed on these tanks at the present time to strengthen capabilities of fighting helicopters. Basically these are 7.62-mm and 12.7-mm machineguns with a rate of fire up to 1,200 and up to 550 rounds a minute respectively. The Leopard-2 and Challenger have been supplied with a 7.62-mm antiaircraft machinegun for firing against airborne targets. In the Leopard it is mounted on a bracket at the loader's hatch and has gun elevations of from -15 to +75 degrees and a unit of fire of 10,000 cartridges. The Challenger's antiaircraft machinegun (with a unit of fire of 4,000 rounds) is installed on a bracket at the commander's hatch and is supplied with remote control permitting fire to be conducted with the hatch closed.

In contrast to the aforementioned, the American M-1 Abrams tank has two anti-aircraft machineguns. The first (12.7-mm with remote control) is mounted ahead of the commander's cupola. Its gun elevations are from -10 to +65 degrees and the unit of fire is 1,000 rounds. The second (a 7.62-mm machinegun without remote control) is located at the loader's hatch. Its gun elevations are from -30 to +65 degrees and the unit of fire is 11,400 rounds.

We will note that there are no sights on machineguns of the M-1 Abrams and Leopard-2 tanks which would give the loaders an opportunity to conduct aimed fire against airborne targets with tank turret hatches closed. Only the

commander of the Leopard-2 tank has a monocular periscopic sight with 3x magnification for firing the 12.7-mm machinegun. It is apparently for this reason that foreign military specialists believe that tank antiaircraft machineguns are insufficiently effective for fighting helicopters and serve rather to reassure the tank crews somewhat.

Foreign reviewers assess the French AMX-30B2 tank's capabilities of fighting helicopters somewhat higher. It is in the inventory of some NATO countries. In addition to a 7.62-mm machinegun mounted on the commander's cupola, this vehicle has a 20-mm automatic gun coaxial with the main 105-mm gun, but with provisions for a gun elevation of +40 degrees for firing against airborne targets independent of the main gun.

But foreign military specialists concur in the opinion that NATO's tanks will not be able to combat helicopters successfully even with the automatic small-caliber guns. It is therefore no accident that searches for new solutions continue abroad. Back in the latter half of the 1970's announcements began to appear in the foreign press about development in NATO countries of multipurpose and special ammunition (which could be used for firing against helicopters) for the guns which are the main tank weapons.

For example, the FRG has developed a round for the 120-mm smoothbore gun of the Leopard-2 tank having a fin-stabilized multipurpose projectile with shaped-charge and fragmentation effect intended for destroying both armored and unarmored targets. The western press noted that after a slight change in projectile design and an increase in the fuze action time such a round could be used for combating helicopters. The West German firm of Rheinmetall is developing an HE fragmentation, fin-stabilized discarding-sabot shell with time fuze for this purpose for the 105-mm gun with which Leopard-1 series tanks are armed. This projectile is filled with a large number of preformed contact elements in the form of metal balls. Foreign specialists note that the probability of killing a helicopter with the first such projectile may increase considerably in comparison with the conventional HE fragmentation shell.

Possibilities of conducting an effective fight against helicopters also are provided in the designs of future tanks. For example, some western press organs have announced that a light tank presently being developed for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force will be armed with a 75-90 mm gun adapted for effective fire against airborne targets as well. A 75-mm gun and 7.62-mm machinegun are mounted in a single-place turret in one of the versions of this tank being developed (weighing up to 20 tons). The unit of fire is 60 rounds with fin-stabilized armor-piercing discarding-sabot or HE fragmentation shells for the gun and 2,600 cartridges for the machinegun. The total traverse is 360 degrees and gun elevation is from -15 to +40 degrees. HE fragmentation shells with a very high muzzle velocity and with an electronic time fuze will be used for firing against airborne targets. This gun can fire single rounds or automatic bursts with a rate of 70 rounds per minute. The tube laying rate is 60 degrees per second both in the horizontal and vertical planes. The maximum range of direct fire approaches 9,000 m.

As is apparent from foreign press reports, the exploration of new possibilities for protecting tanks against helicopters continues. This merges with the overall stream of NATO military preparations for unleashing military adventures.

COPYRIGHT: "Znamenosets", 1984

6904

CSO: 1801/358

END